GMAR Call To Action - Tell the DNR to Approve Waukesha's Request for Lake Michigan Water.

Next week the DNR will be holding three public hearings on Waukesha's application for Great Lakes water. We encourage you to tell the DNR to approve the application.

The DNR has concluded that accessing Lake Michigan water is the only reasonable alternative for Waukesha, however, opponents are waging a well-funded and well-organized campaign to stop it.

The first hearing is Monday, August 17, 2015, beginning with a DNR presentation at 5:30 pm, then public testimony at 6:30 pm. The hearing will be held at the Carroll University Center for Graduate Studies Auditorium (LL14). Please note that this is not at the main campus. The address is 2140 Davidson Road, Waukesha.

There will be two hearings on Tuesday, August 18th, one in Milwaukee (1:00 pm presentation, 2:00 pm hearing at the UWM Zilber School of Public Health, 1240 N. 10th Street, Milwaukee) and another in Racine (5:30 pm presentation, 6:30 pm hearing at the Racine Masonic Center, 1012 Main Street, Racine).

We encourage you to provide spoken testimony at one or more of the hearings in support of the DNR's conclusions and Waukesha receiving Lake Michigan water.

Testimony will likely be limited to three minutes (about 400 words). You should use your own words to express your opinions and feelings about the water application, and how it will affect the city and its residents and businesses. It is important to show that this proposal affects real people and businesses. Try to refrain from comments that relate to more water for
growth or expansion of businesses or land development. That is not the objective of the application. Click here for some talking points.

For more info go to http://waukesha-water.com.
Exhibit E
Q&A with Waukesha Community Development Director STEVE CRANDELL

Talking past successes, present projects, future development

By Sarah Pryor
Freeman Staff

WAUKESHA — What will Waukesha look like in five years?

Community Development Director Steve Crandell doesn't have a crystal ball, but after working for the city for more than 37 years, he does have an eye for where things are going.

"I see us continuing to grow to the west," Crandell said. "There are 1,500 acres still in our water and sewer service area, much of which is relatively vacant land. It would require annexation (from the Town of Waukesha) for sewer and water service of course, but it's a logical extension."

Crandell also said that in five years he sees the former Fox Run shopping center — now all but deserted — and the former Jewel-Osco shopping center on Highway 164 bustling with new tenants.

"I'm optimistic," Crandell said.

In 1976, a longer-haired Crandell walked into Waukesha City Hall to find a map of the city he'd just moved to because his wife Mary had gotten a job in speech pathology here. While there, he heard the city had an opening and decided to apply. He's never left.

In his almost four-decade career, Crandell has almost seen it all. He sat down with The Freeman to talk about past successes, present projects and future predictions for the city's development.

THE FREEMAN: What do you think has been the city's biggest achievement, development-wise, since you started your career?

STEVE CRANDELL: One of the biggest achievements is that one of the first tax incremental financing districts we did was for GE Medical, to extend utilities out there to allow for the construction of the global headquarters. We were one of the first cities in the state to actually implement TIF and we've used it to put together seven industrial parks, providing hundreds of millions of dollars in new tax base and thousands of new jobs. I'm just as proud of the work we've done since the '90s on the revitalization of downtown. One of the projects that really is near and dear to my heart is the 13 years I spent leading the team for the Fox River Corridor Development. It took a neglected natural resource and turned it into a jewel.

FREEMAN: We hear lots of reader concerns about vacant buildings such as those in the Fox Run shopping center. What can the city do to revitalize areas like this?

CRANDELL: When we talk about redevelopment, lots of people associate it with our central city, but it can and has occurred on the perimeter of our community as well. The former Spancrete site was an abandoned industrial plant, and it is now the home of a 250,000-square-foot Woodman's that the city partnered with, using TIF to make that development a reality. Even before that, the former Fleming food distribution center on Sunset Drive was vacant for four or five years and is now the Shoppes at Fox River. As circumstances and economic times change, we can do that for Jewel-Osco and Fox Run. We have talked to the folks at Fox Run and will continue that discussion to move that type of perimeter redevelopment forward.

See CRANDELL, PAGE 5A
Steve Crandell, Waukesha’s director of community development, shares his thoughts during a Thursday interview.

**Article Continued Below**

See CRANDELL on Page A05

Crandell

*From Page 1A*

The economy is improving, and that will be a driving factor.

**FREEMAN**: What other areas of the city would you like to see redeveloped?

CRANDELL: I’d like to see the continued redevelopment of the downtown. We have some key sites downtown prime for redevelopment: the site next to Main Street Plaza and of course the Huelsman/Davies piece below City Hall. It’s almost the Gold Coast of the downtown. Not many communities have a piece of property that large downtown. It’s not a question of if it will develop, but of when. We’ve talked to individuals about that Main Street property, but it’s a difficult time for a development of that size. We need to find a single user to get that developed, and we’re working on it.

**FREEMAN**: Do you think downtown Waukesha is in good shape, development-wise?

CRANDELL: I believe we’ve seen an increase in vacancies down there over the past year. It could be the economy. What are the factors of that? We’re not sure. From a city standpoint, we recognize the infrastructure and streetscape are dated. That was an important component of our Central City Master Plan: a new streetscape design. New infrastructure – lights, trash receptacles, planters – we need to replace that.

**FREEMAN**: How can the city work to fill downtown’s vacant storefronts sans the Business Improvement District?

CRANDELL: I was truly disappointed when the BID was terminated. The downtown BID is a needed organization, and it was one component of a successful, well-balanced downtown. We need a BID or an organization like BID to be put back in place to manage, to market and to be advocates for downtown, and for business retention and recruitment. BIDs have worked throughout the state, and it worked in Waukesha for 26 years. I believe it can work again. When’s the right time to bring it back? I don’t know, but I believe strongly that an organization like the BID needs to be put in place. Downtown needs to be managed just like a strip center or mall. In the meantime, all of us, including the city, the (Waukesha Downtown Business Association), the property owners and the people of this community need to talk up Waukesha. If they have a contact with someone,
forward them to the appropriate individuals. We need to work together to try to fill those stores. It's not just one organization. It's not the city, it's not the WDBA, it's not the property owners. We need to work together to sell downtown to potential businesses. In the Community Development office, we don't just sit here and wait for (developers) to come and see us. We work with the owners to assist them however we can. It's a long process and we're in competition with other cities in the state and region.

FREEMAN: How can Waukesha stay competitive in attracting development?

CRANDELL: As cities, we need to remain strong advocates to keep in place the limited financial tools we have: TIF, industrial revenue bonds and community development block grants. We need to be advocates to the state and federal government so that those tools don't get watered down to the point they're not usable. If we lose those tools, we're in trouble. Also, I understand the economic conditions over the past several years, but the economy is going to get better and when it does, I'd like to see us as a city move forward to try to develop an economic development fund in partnership with local lenders. We could leverage that money with state and federal dollars to promote development. I hate to sound crass, but when it comes down to business retention and expansion, it comes down to who has the most money.

FREEMAN: You served as interim city administrator on two different occasions, putting together two city budgets. Would you ever consider becoming a city administrator full-time?

CRANDELL: I was very humbled by the opportunity to do it twice, but as I made very clear throughout budget process, it's not something I'd like to do on a full-time basis. I've been very fortunate to work well with the previous city administrators, and I believe I work very well with the current one. I did two budgets as city administrator. I appreciated the confidence and cooperation of aldermen, department directors and city employees during those two times. We kept the boat afloat.

FREEMAN: So when are you going to retire?

CRANDELL: You never know.

Email: spryor@conleynet.com
Woodman’s re-zoning gets express checkout

Alderwoman concerned about competition, loss of manufacturing

By Sarah Pryor Freeman Staff

WAUKESHA – Woodman’s Food Markets is inching closer to opening up a Waukesha location, but after Tuesday night’s Common Council meeting, it’s clear the Janesville-based grocery store chain won’t coast its way through the approval process with no resistance.

The Common Council voted 14-1 to re-zone 33.7 acres of land at the former Spancrete site at East Main Street and Les Paul Parkway from a manufacturing to a business district, as well as amending the city’s land use plan for that area from industrial to commercial.

City Planner Jennifer Andrews explained that the Community Development Department rarely supports eliminating manufacturing districts from the city because they offer high employment and tax bases, but in the case of Woodman’s, the city staff supports the change.

“This is like hitting the reset button on 33 acres in the heart of the city,” Andrews told the council.

However, Alderwoman Kathleen Cummings said she’s concerned that the city has “zoned away” almost 200 acres of manufacturing districts in the past 10 years for projects like Walmart, the Carroll University dorms, the Shoppes at Fox River and more.

Community Development Director Steve Crandell told the council that although the city has zoned away several industrial areas over the years, it has also added some, such as the area by Sunset and Sentry Drives.

Andrews said that the former Spancrete site is no longer appropriate for a manufacturing district now that the neighborhood makeup has changed and it’s a largely residential area. She said it would be a better idea to have a manufacturing district near Highway 164 South, in the Town of Waukesha, because city staff expect the city limits to grow to the south.

Cummings pointed out that the future expansion is just an assumption by the city, and though she acknowledged that she’d probably shop at the Waukesha Woodman’s when and if it opens, the former Spancrete site could still be used for a manufacturing district, such as a technology incubator.

Cummings also expressed concern that Woodman’s would potentially open right in Pick ‘n Save’s backyard, and asked the council what would happen if Pick ‘n Save becomes a blighted area later on.

Bret Backus, Woodman’s vice president of corporate real estate, told the council that when Woodman’s opened its Oak Creek location, it actually enhanced the community by not only lowering prices at its own store, but other area grocery stores including a Pick ‘n Save.

“It’s not a matter of Woodman’s coming to town and trying to run existing businesses out of town and take away jobs,” Backus said. “As a new kid coming to town, we hope to have a positive impact not only on those that come to our stores, but also people that continue to shop at the stores they’re loyal to.”

Alderman Chris Hernandez, who represents the district where the Woodman’s would be located, said he supports the project fully.

“I’ve heard lots of complaints from constituents that everything’s growing in the southwestern part of Waukesha, so I’m glad to see it start expanding on the northeastern side,” Hernandez said. “It’s absolutely a step in the right direction.”

Email: spryor@conleynet.com

Alderman Aaron Perry looked for two items when he first saw the news release regarding last week's house fire on the city's far southwest side.

If anyone was injured and the Fire Department's response time.

Thankfully, no one was hurt in the fire that is believed was ignited by a lightning strike during heavy early morning
thunderstorms June 25. Perry saw that the response time it took to arrive at 1653 Moccasin Trail was just under 10 minutes.

With the Waukesha Fire Department stating its response time goal is seven minutes — meaning its crew should be able to arrive at a scene within this time frame from any of its five stations — Perry wants to see improvements.

"It's not a knock on the Fire Department and in fact I am impressed with Chief (Jesse) Alba, but as the population increases and the geography of our city changes, we have to make sure the services are met," said the District 12 alderman.

District 12 is where the single-family residence fire occurred and why Perry wants to work with Alba and city officials to pursue relocating Station No. 3, 1210 Sentry Drive, the nearest station to this area.

Perry addressing this issue is no surprise.

When asked what the people in District 12 want to see addressed in an interview before he was elected alderman, Perry said "the fire response time issue." He said he would accomplish this by getting Station No. 3 relocated closer to the district, most likely on the land off Oakdale Drive.

"This is an issue on the minds of residents as I've seen going door to door," Perry said at the time. "This is an issue of safety and making sure the residents of this area of the city are represented fairly in regards to services provided by the Fire Department."

Station No. 2 was first

Alba is in agreement with Perry and said the department has been studying relocating Station 3 for the last few years, and that was part of a package to relocate Stations No. 2 and 3.

Alba, however, said despite the Council supporting both relocations in 2011, voted to just approve the move for Station 2, which at the time was also outside of the seven-minute response goal, from 1701 Stardust Drive to 1714 Pearl St.

"(Some of District 12, including Moccasin Trail) is the last area that has the extended response times that isn't quite at 10 minutes," Alba said. "That is one of the areas south of Waukesha West High School."

He said the department has taken a proactive approach in working with the city administrator, the Community Development Department and the Wisconsin Department of Transportation.

Need to find land

But Alba said the only holdups right now are finding the right location, preferably just southwest of its current location, and the financial support.

"We have to be economically mindful and coordinate with other things in our community such as the Highway 59 bypass," said Alba, who added land would have to be purchased along with a proposal given to the Common Council on how a new location would be beneficial.

Nevertheless, he said he is very confident that "we would have the support of the Common Council."

"I don't believe there would be roadblocks, so the opportunity will be there," Alba said. "We have a lot of support, but we just have to find the right circumstances to move. The economy is recovering so that will help from a capital perspective, so I believe it will be more of a matter of when we relocate. We just have to find the time and place to make it happen."

Preventing more damage

If it does in the near future, Perry is confident it will eliminate the amount of damage during future fires. The initial estimate was that the fire resulted in $75,000 worth of damage. The assessed value of the house before the fire was $718,000.

Perry stopped by the house last week and while he hasn't heard any complaints on the response time from the homeowners and said he knows "a relocation is quite an undertaking," he's making it his focus.

"If it would have been five minutes earlier there would have been less damage and less of a cost," said Perry, who recently did a ride-along with the department. "I'm not trying to spark an outcry, but I want to spur the talk on action."

Alba agrees and wanted to compliment his department.

"I'm very pleased with the department's performance as the firefighters made a great stop," Alba said. "It could have been much worse and was a pretty positive outcome for what could have been a pretty tragic incident. While you could say it's a
$75,000 loss, I challenge that it was a more than ($640,000) save."

City growing

Station No. 3 has been at its current location since 1981.

At that time, Alba said it met the residents' needs. But as he points out, the department has to change along with the city.

"The city has gotten a lot bigger, especially with the annexations you hear where people are coming into city," Alba said. "We can expect more growth and many are on the south end of the city so we're looking at moving that station a little bit southwest to better serve that part for current residents and the future. That's the goal."
Exhibit F
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM
WATER DEMAND PROJECTIONS – RESPONSE TO DNR

To: Waukesha Water Utility
Prepared by: Richard Hope, P.E., AECOM
Date: February 19, 2014
Subject: Water Demand Projections – Response to DNR
Waukesha, Wisconsin

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this Technical Memorandum (TM) is to respond to the WDNR TM dated December 3, 2013, particularly regarding industrial demand projections.

Water demand projections for the Waukesha Water Supply Service Area (WWSSA) were presented in the Water Demand Projections TM dated July 12, 2013. An envelope of projected water demands was developed to cover the range of probable water demands over a long range planning period. Figure 1 presents the envelope of projected average day water demands presented in the July 12, 2013 TM. After the additional analysis presented in this TM, the average day demand of 10.1 million gallons per day (MGD) at buildout (estimated 2050) – as presented in Water Demand Projections TM dated July 12, 2013 – is considered appropriate for planning purposes by current water industry standards and based on communication with industrial water customers. The 2050 projected water demand includes the impact of reducing water usage by 1.0 MGD through a proactive water conservation program.

FIGURE 1: PROJECTED AVERAGE DAY WATER DEMANDS WITH ENVELOPE

10.1 MGD – Recommended Buildout Average Day Demand for Planning Purposes
The low estimate in the envelope in Figure 1 assumes that current water usage continues at recent historical levels but is adjusted for the planned impact of water conservation. This is reasonable for residential, commercial and public water use. However, industrial water use is difficult to forecast due to potential expansion or redevelopment of existing industrial customers and the variability of potential water use by new industrial customers. The small number of industries served by the City of Waukesha had an average day water demand of 0.9 MGD in 2012, which represents approximately 13 percent of the total demand. Therefore, a change in water use of existing industrial customers or a new moderately water intensive industrial customer will have a material impact on the future water needs of the Utility.

The potential for an increase in industrial water demands is reinforced by recent communications the City of Waukesha had with existing and potential new industrial customers, which is summarized below:

1. Several industrial customers are considering increasing production to pre-recession levels. If this transpires, industrial water demand could increase by approximately 0.6 MGD.
2. An industry is investigating developing within the City of Waukesha, which may increase the average industrial water usage by approximately 1.0 MGD.

As one would expect representatives for industries considering increasing production and potential new development have requested that their plans remain confidential for business reasons.

To maximize water conservation, Waukesha Water Utility will continue to work with existing and future users to help evaluate and implement ways to reduce their water use.

The average day water demand of 10.1 MGD for buildout is reasonable for planning of future infrastructure improvements, based on current water industry planning standards and communications with industrial water customers.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources’ (WDNR) Technical Memorandum “Waukesha Diversion Application Demand Rate Projections” dated December 3, 2013 provided comments on the methodology for the projection of industrial water demands presented in the final draft of the Technical Memorandum on Water Demand Projections dated July 12, 2013 (AECOM).

The WDNR correctly recognized that industrial water demand has the potential for the greatest impact on the future water demands and requested a response to the following:

1. A description of the types of industries the city intends to attract and their anticipated water demands.
2. A detailed account of existing industries that may be currently running at reduced capacity and how economic changes would lead to expanded water use for those facilities.
3. An explanation of how a projected significant increase in industrial demand will conform with the City’s water conservation plan and its effort to promote conservation to industrial customers.
4. Evidence-based explanation for the departure from recent trends in the industrial demand rate.

Representatives from Waukesha and WDNR met on December 18, 2013 to review the water demand projections and the key items discussed were:

1. An underestimate of future water demands would have significant cost implication in the construction of water supply facilities. The life expectancies of water infrastructure facilities range from 20 to 40 years for pumping equipment and 100 years for pipelines; therefore, it is good engineering practice not to undersize major water infrastructure.

2. It is difficult to accurately project water demands 40 years in the future. Therefore, it is best practice to develop a range of water demands based on varied planning assumptions. The range of possible future demands is framed by high and low projections. For planning purposes, the City selected an average day water demand at buildout of 10.1 MGD that is approximately in the middle of the projected range. This demand includes the impact of a 1.0 MGD reduction in water use from conservation.

3. The water demand for an existing industrial user could change due to expansion and/or a change in industry type.

4. The Waukesha Water Utility currently has a small number of industries and their associated low current water demand (0.9 MGD in 2012) represents approximately 13 percent of the total water requirements. Consequently, a change in water usage of a small number of existing or future industrial customers can have a major impact on the projected water use for industrial class customers.

5. The demand forecast information for residential, commercial and public customer sectors – based on a combined per capita (before conservation) of 81 gallons per capita per day (gpcd) as presented in the Water Demand Projections TM dated July 12, 2013 – is accepted for planning purposes.

2.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this TM is to respond to the WDNR TM dated December 3, 2013. This TM focuses on the industrial portion of the demand forecast for buildout (2050) for the WWSSA.

3.0 LOW ESTIMATE OF WATER DEMAND

In the final draft of the Technical Memorandum on Water Demand Projections dated July 12, 2013 (AECOM), an envelope of projected water demands was developed, which is an established approach for predicting the likely range of future water demands. This section presents how the estimates that frame the low end of the envelope were determined and why this low estimate should not be used for planning purposes.

Industrial water demand in the City of Waukesha has experienced a declining trend over the last 20 plus years, but appears to have stabilized in the last 4 to 5 years as illustrated in Figure 2. Fluctuations in water demands are expected due to weather, impact of water conservation, and the status of the economy.
FIGURE 2: HISTORICAL INDUSTRIAL WATER USE

The average daily water demand for industrial users from 2008 through 2012 was approximately 0.9 MGD. Based on the 1,452 acres of developed industrial land, the average industrial water demand is 642 gallons per acre per day. It should be noted that existing industries may expand their facilities within their current boundaries and this would increase water use per acre.

Using an industrial water demand intensity of 642 gallons per acre per day and a total per capita water demand of 81 gallons per person per day for residential, commercial and public water use (without conservation) results in projected water demands of approximately 8.91 MGD and 9.85 MGD for 2030 and buildout (2050), respectively.

With the water conservation goals (0.5 MGD by 2030 and 1.0 MGD by buildout), the projected water demands are reduced to 8.41 MGD and 8.85 MGD by 2030 and buildout.

These projections represent the low estimate for water demands. Because future conditions are uncertain and the financial and environmental consequences of undersizing water infrastructure are large, major new water supply systems are not designed or planned to meet only the lowest predicted demands. Responsible planning and proven professional engineering best management requires the City of Waukesha to account for the impact of potential growth in industrial water use in the overall projection of water demands. The following sections discuss the impact of industrial demand and highlight the impact that the future industrial water usage has on the total water demand projections.

4.0 INDUSTRIAL WATER USAGE

The City of Waukesha, similar to most cities, welcomes industrial development and the associated economic benefit it brings. It is very difficult to project the types of industry that will develop in the City of Waukesha and their associated water needs over the next 40 years.

As noted earlier, the number of industrial customers within the City of Waukesha is relatively small (less than 1 percent of the current total utility customers). As a result, a change in the water use of a small number of existing industrial customers or a new industry with higher than the current average water demand can have a large impact on the industrial water usage. This is illustrated by the following facts:
1. Two industrial customers’ water use, post-September 11, 2001, account for an industrial sector usage decline of approximately 380 gallons per acre per day. Therefore, if the two customers were still operating at pre-September 11, 2001 levels, the City of Waukesha’s current industrial usage would be approximately 1,000 gallons per acre per day (an increase of approximately 0.6 MGD).

2. A good example of the expected increased industrial water demand is the recent notice from an industry that has informed the City that they plan to increase production to pre 2001 levels within the next 5 years.

3. An existing industrial customer is planning to increase production at their existing facilities and this will result in water usage above current levels.

4. The City was recently approached by a representative for an industrial customer wanting to locate within the City of Waukesha. The estimated water use of this potential new customer would increase the average industrial water usage by approximately 700 gallons per acre per day (an increase of approximately 1.0 MGD).

5. The impact of four new industrial customers with water demands between 0.25 and 0.5 MGD would result in an overall industrial demand increase of 1 to 2 MGD above the low water demand.

Growth in industrial water demand will be due to a combination of new industries and the expansion of existing industries within their current boundaries (Item 1, 2, and 3 above). Increased production or expansion of existing industries will increase the water intensity factor (gallons per acre per day) of the current developed industrial land.

The industries which have been in contact with the City regarding increased production, expansion of their facilities, or new development have requested that their business plans remain confidential.

Although it is difficult to project industrial usage in the future, it is reasonable to forecast that 8 to 10 moderately sized new industrial customers could redevelop existing industrial acreage or develop the available industrial land within the WWSSA. It is also a reasonable assumption that the City’s existing industrial customers water usage could rebound to pre-recession levels over the planning period. Either or both of these could increase the industrial water usage.

The July 2013 TM projected industrial water demand is based on 1,297 gallons per acre per day (discussed further below). The industrial demand at buildout (without conservation) is projected at 2.38 MGD. This represents a potential 1.2 MGD increase over the low water demand industrial projection.

To provide additional explanation of the projected industrial water demands, the following were reviewed:

1. Guidelines for projecting industrial water demand based on acreage of industrial land
2. Impacts of new industrial water user(s) and/or the expansion of existing industrial user(s)

Projected industrial low water demands for both current and future consumption were developed by applying the recent industrial water use of 642 gallons per acre per day.
Limited guidelines are available on typical industrial water use intensity factors, however, the following were considered:

1. The Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission (SEWRPC) assumes 1,500 gallons per acre per day for undeveloped industrial land.

2. The Water Distribution System Handbook edited by Larry Mays from Arizona State University and published by McGraw Hill provided the following general information for industrial water demand:

3. The July 2013 AECOM TM on water demand addressed the uncertainty in future industry development by assuming an industrial water demand of 1,297 gallons per acre per day. This was the Waukesha industrial water intensity factor from 2000 (prior to downturn in the economy).

4. Current industrial water demand of 642 gallons per acre per day.

5. Information from Waukesha from existing and potential industrial customers indicated that the water usage could increase by approximately 1,000 gallons per acre per day to 1,642 gallons per acre per day.

The wide range of potential industrial water intensity factors, illustrates how water use is heavily influenced by the type of industry and/or changes by a small number of users. Therefore, projections are difficult for industrial users.

As discussed previously, new industries or the expansion of an existing industry is hard to predict. However, it is prudent to plan for industrial water use to change over the next 40 years.

Table 1 summarizes the change in industrial demand projection based on varying industrial demand intensities.

---

**TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF CHANGE IN INDUSTRIAL DEMAND AT BUILDOUT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry Water Demand Intensity</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Increase in Industrial Demand at Buildout from Low Water Demand Projection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,500 gallons per acre per day£</td>
<td>SEWRPC</td>
<td>0.3 MGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,620 gallons per acre per day£</td>
<td>Water Distribution System Handbook</td>
<td>0.4 MGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,297 gallons per acre per day£</td>
<td>Water Demand Projections TM dated July 12, 2013</td>
<td>1.2 MGD4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,642 gallons per acre per day£</td>
<td>Based on discussion with existing and potential customers by the Utility</td>
<td>1.8 MGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher water user(s) and/or change in water use of existing user(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 to 2 MGD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Industrial water demand in the low water demand projection is based on 642 gallons per acre per day.
2 Water demand intensity for future land development (380 acres).
3 Water demand intensity for entire buildout acreage (1,832 acres).
4 Industrial water demand increase included in the projected planning average day demand for buildout.
4.1 Conclusion

This section illustrates the potential range in future industrial water demands. The water demand envelope presented in the July 2013 TM addresses this uncertainty. The projected increase of 1.2 MGD in industrial water demand is used to project the average day water demand of 10.1 MGD at buildout which includes consideration for water conservation.

5.0 SUMMARY

Responsible planning and professional management practice requires that the design of a new water supply must accommodate water demands that can meet more than just the lowest estimated water demands. This is because conditions in the future are uncertain and the financial and environmental consequence of underestimating water demands, and therefore undersizing system improvements, are large. The following water demand projections for buildout from the final draft of the Technical Memorandum on Water Demand Projections dated July 12, 2013 are reasonable for planning purposes:

Buildout Average Day Demand – 10.1 MGD
Buildout Maximum Day Demand – 16.7 MGD

It is also recommended that the Waukesha Water Utility continue its established practice of reviewing water demand projections every five years.
Exhibit G
RACIAL DISPARITIES, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, AND RACIALIZED POLITICS IN MILWAUKEE AND WISCONSIN: AN ANALYSIS OF SENATE FACTORS FIVE AND SIX OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Expert Report Submitted on Behalf of Plaintiffs in Frank v. Walker, Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-01128(LA)

Marc V. Levine, Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

May 18, 2012 (Revised October 18, 2013)
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Introduction

The purpose of this report is twofold: first, to analyze racial and ethnolinguistic disparities in socioeconomic status in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and their relationship to the likely impact of voter ID legislation in the state; and second, to examine whether racial issues have historically been injected into politics in Milwaukee and Wisconsin. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Frank v. Walker, Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-01128(LA) retained me to analyze issues surrounding voter ID in Wisconsin that pertain to Senate Factors Five and Six of the Voting Rights Act. Section I of the report examines the degree to which the Milwaukee metropolitan area exhibits entrenched, persistent, and profound racial and ethnic inequality and socioeconomic disparities – across a wide range of indicators, and to a degree virtually unrivaled in the United States. The section also analyzes the extent to which these disparities and this distress would likely produce differential and deleterious racial impacts of Wisconsin’s voter identification statute, Wisconsin Act 23, enacted in May 2011, and thus hinder the ability of minorities to equally participate in the electoral process. Section II analyzes the history of racialized politics in Milwaukee and in Wisconsin, and places the politics of voter fraud and voter ID in this larger historical context.

I am a Professor of History, Economic Development, and Urban Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM), where I have been on the faculty since 1984. I am also a Senior Fellow at the university’s Center for Economic Development, where I was the founder and director from 1990-2007. I also direct the university’s Center for Canadian-American Policy Studies and Consortium for Economic Opportunity, and am past director of UWM’s graduate programs in Urban Studies. I have also recently been a Visiting Professor at the Université de Paris – Ouest, and have lectured at universities throughout North America and Europe. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached. I am being compensated $150 per hour for my work on this project, including any deposition or testimony in court. I have not testified in court nor been deposed during the past four years (other than the August 2012 deposition in this case).

My academic expertise lies generally in two main areas: urban economic development, with particular emphasis on labor market issues and the political economy of urban redevelopment; and on the politics and economics of ethnic and cultural diversity in cities. I teach courses on these subjects at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. I am the author or co-author of four books and forty book chapters and peer-reviewed articles on these and other scholarly subjects. In addition, I have written 35 working papers and research reports, under the aegis of the UWM Center for Economic Development, on various aspects of economic development in Milwaukee, including in particular social and economic conditions in Milwaukee’s inner city neighborhoods and racial disparities in the region’s labor markets. I have also written numerous newspaper columns, in The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, The Baltimore Sun, The Montreal Gazette, La Presse (Montreal), and Le Devoir (Montreal), on issues of inequality, economic
Section I: Racial Disparities and Socioeconomic Status

Senate Factor Five of the VRA calls for an assessment of “the extent to which members of the minority group bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process.”

Overview: Metropolitan Milwaukee\(^1\), to a degree virtually unrivaled in the United States, exhibits entrenched, persistent, and profound racial and ethnic inequality and socioeconomic disparities. On indicator after indicator, for blacks and Hispanics, metro Milwaukee ranks among the most distressed—if not the most distressed—metropolises in the country, and disparities between whites and minority communities on a broad array of socioeconomic indicators are generally wider than in most U.S. metropolitan areas. Minority communities in Greater Milwaukee generally live in neighborhoods described by sociologists such as Harvard University’s William Julius Wilson and Robert J. Sampson as experiencing “concentrated disadvantage,” where an accumulation of inequalities and resource deficiencies reinforce one another and create conditions for the perpetuation of inequality and distress.

Many of these disparities are also apparent at the state level. Political science research makes clear that such disparities significantly hinder equal participation in the political process. By adding to the “costs” of voting, especially in view of racial and ethnic disparities in the ability to secure valid identification or documentation, Wisconsin Act 23 will disproportionately and deleteriously affect minority communities in Wisconsin for whom effective participation in the electoral process is already hindered by the effects of historical and contemporary discrimination.

The following reviews key evidence on the socioeconomic status of minority communities in Wisconsin and on racial disparities.

Segregation

Milwaukee’s racial geography has been marked by a long-standing historical pattern of extreme segregation, which continues through today. Milwaukee has ranked among the nation’s four or five most racially segregated cities and metropolitan areas since the 1950s, when black migration to the city accelerated dramatically. Mass black migration to Milwaukee occurred later than for most northern cities, but between 1950 and 1980, the black population in metro Milwaukee grew from just under 22,000 to almost 150,000, the fastest rate of increase in the country (it is over 255,000 today). Almost all Milwaukee’s black population concentrated in so-called Inner Core neighborhoods on the city’s near

\(^1\) Throughout this report, the Milwaukee metropolitan area refers to the four-county region encompassing Milwaukee, Waukesha, Washington, and Ozaukee Counties, as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
north side, and by 1970, according to the most authoritative study of racial segregation in American cities, Milwaukee posted the fifth highest level of segregation among the 30 U.S. metropolises containing large black populations. The standard measure of segregation used by sociologists is the “index of dissimilarity,” and a measure of 60 is considered “high” segregation; 80 is considered “extreme” segregation. By 1970, the black-white index of dissimilarity in Milwaukee was 90.5, and it has never dipped below 80 since.

Moreover, by 1980, using five different indicators of segregation (dissimilarity, isolation, clustering, centralization, and concentration), researchers identified Milwaukee as one of the nation’s most hypersegregated large metropolitan areas, ranking in the top five on each of these indicators. As Douglas S. Massey points out: “A high level of segregation on any single dimension is problematic because it isolates a minority group from amenities, opportunities, and resources that affect socioeconomic well-being. As high levels of segregation accumulate across dimensions, however, the deleterious effects of segregation multiply.”

Between 1980-2010, although segregation rates remained very high in 39 of the nation’s 102 largest metropolitan areas, several metropolises showed signs of modest African American residential desegregation. For example, even as these cities remained highly segregated, over the past thirty years the “black-white” index of dissimilarity declined in Atlanta by 14.7 points; in Boston by 12.3; in Detroit by 12.2; in Chicago by 11.4; and in Cleveland by 11.3. By contrast, in Milwaukee, the black-white segregation index declined by a scant 2.4 points between 1980-2010, the lowest rate of “desegregation” of any large metropolitan area in the country.

In short, even as major metro areas across the U.S. have modestly desegregated since the 1980s, Milwaukee’s rate of black-white segregation has barely budged. Not

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3 The index of dissimilarity measures the degree to which racial groups are evenly spread among neighborhoods in a metro area or city, with respect to the racial composition of the city or region as a whole. Thus, as Massey and Denton note: “The index of dissimilarity gives the percentage of blacks who would have to move to achieve an ‘even’ residential pattern – one where every neighborhood replicates the racial composition of the city.” (p. 20).
4 Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, p. 64.
5 Ibid. p. 76.
7 These 39 “high segregation” metros are the ones with dissimilarity index scores over 60.
only has Milwaukee persistently ranked among the nation’s most racially segregated metropolitan areas since 1970, but in contrast to many of the country’s historically most segregated regions, the residential segregation of African Americans has barely diminished in Milwaukee over the past thirty years.

Three studies based on 2010 U.S. census data confirm Milwaukee’s status as America’s most racially segregated metropolitan area. William Frey of the University of Michigan and the Brookings Institution examined segregation rates in the nation’s 102 largest metropolitan areas, using the index of dissimilarity: Milwaukee posted the highest rate of black-white segregation in the country (the region ranked 2nd in 2000 and 5th in 1990). Frey also examined “Hispanic-white” segregation” and found that Milwaukee ranked 9th highest in the rate of Hispanic-white segregation in 2010 (compared to 11th highest in 2000 and 14th highest in 1990). Although the segregation of Milwaukee’s Hispanic population is less intense than for blacks – the Hispanic-white segregation rate in 2010 (57.0) was substantially lower than the black-white rate (81.5)– Hispanic segregation in Milwaukee nevertheless ranks among the worst in the nation.9

A second study, produced by Brown University segregation expert John Logan, replicated Frey’s dissimilarity measures as well as calculated another measure of segregation – the level of racial isolation (i.e. the percentage minority in the neighborhood where the average minority group member lives). Milwaukee’s black-white isolation index of 65.5 placed it as the 5th most segregated among the 50 metropolitan areas in the U.S. with the largest black populations in 2010; by contrast, Milwaukee ranked 9th in 2000 and 8th in 1990.

Finally, a study by Edward Glaeser of Harvard and Jacob Vigdor of Duke, using a slightly different methodology that measured “black-nonblack” segregation (instead of the more conventional “black-white” or “Hispanic-white”) found, like Frey and Logan, that using the dissimilarity index, Milwaukee was the most segregated metropolitan area in the country in 2010. Using their version of the isolation index, they ranked Milwaukee as the most segregated by that indicator as well. The findings are especially striking since the Glaeser-Vigdor study received substantial national publicity for trumpeting a “pervasive decline” in residential segregation in the U.S. between 1970 and 2010. Among the nation’s most segregated metropolitan areas, however, Milwaukee’s desegregation was the smallest and slowest – a tenacious holdout to the general pattern.10

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9 These Hispanic segregation figures are consistent with data on what the census bureau called “linguistic isolation”: households in which no person age 14 or over speaks English at least “very well.” The 2010 census revealed that 31.8 percent of Milwaukee’s Hispanic population lived in such households, up from 24.7 percent in 2010 and 18.9 percent in 1990. In 20 census tracts across Milwaukee’s south side, the rate of such “linguistic isolation” was over 40 percent, a sign of the degree to which linguistic segregation is also part of Milwaukee’s demographic and socio-economic landscape.

The residential hypersegregation of metropolitan Milwaukee also underpins segregation in institutions, such as public schools. Data from the National Center on Education Statistics for 2009-2010 shows that for public primary school students, Milwaukee has the 2nd most segregated schools among the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas, measured by the black-white dissimilarity index. Milwaukee ranked 8th most segregated among the 100 in Hispanic-white school segregation. As eminent education researcher Gary Orfield of UCLA has noted, the state of Wisconsin as a whole has witnessed a dramatic increase in “resegregated” schools “due largely to the spread of segregation in the Milwaukee area which has long had one of the nation’s most intensely segregated housing markets.” In 2006, over 72 percent of black students in Wisconsin attended schools in which over 50% of the students were minorities (Wisconsin ranked as the 16th most segregated state by this measure); over 41 percent of Wisconsin black students attended schools that were over 90% minority in composition (Wisconsin ranked as the 11th most segregated state by this measure).

At the heart of metropolitan Milwaukee’s hypersegregation is this fact: Milwaukee has the lowest rate of black suburbanization of any large metropolitan area in the country. As Table 1 shows, among the nation’s most segregated metropolises in 2010 --the seven metros posting the highest dissimilarity scores in the Frey study—Milwaukee had, by far, the lowest percentage of blacks and Hispanics living in the region’s suburbs. Only 8.8 percent of metro Milwaukee’s blacks lived in the region’s suburbs in 2010. By contrast, in metro areas such as Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit, with overall levels of segregation comparable to Milwaukee’s as measured by the dissimilarity index, black suburbanization rates range between 40 and 50 percent. The racial “suburbanization gap” in Milwaukee —the difference in the percentages of blacks and whites living in the suburbs—is far greater, at over 70 percentage points, than any other metropolis in the country, including, as Table 1 shows, even the nation’s most segregated metropolitan areas. The Hispanic level of suburbanization in Milwaukee, though much higher than the black rate, still lags significantly behind other highly segregated metropolises. In short, to a greater extent than any large region in the country, Milwaukee’s

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2012. Critics have pointed out that the Glaeser-Vigdor methodology of measuring “black-nonblack” segregation instead of the more traditional “black-white” segregation overstates the degree of desegregation that has occurred in cities. But given that their methodology exaggerates the extent of desegregation in cities, it is remarkable how persistently segregated Milwaukee has remained, even in their analysis.


13 Ibid. p. 29.

minorities are concentrated in the urban core, in neighborhoods, as I will examine shortly, marked by concentrated poverty, joblessness, and other measures of socioeconomic distress.

Table 1:

**Suburbanization, Race, and Ethnicity**

Percentage of metro area population living in suburbs, by race and ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metro Area</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White Non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Black-White Gap</th>
<th>Hispanic-White Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Summary File 2, 2010

Several factors contribute to Milwaukee’s exceptionally low rate of black suburbanization. Two deserve particular mention. First, the private housing industry, especially the mortgage lending market, “has played a pivotal role in determining residential patterns” in metro Milwaukee.\(^{15}\) In 1988, a highly publicized, Pulitzer prize winning series in *The Atlanta Journal Constitution* revealed that Milwaukee had the biggest gap in mortgage denial rates between whites and nonwhites in the country.\(^{16}\) Subsequent government reports and academic studies confirmed that these racial disparities persisted into the 2000s; a 2008 study, for example, found that metropolitan Milwaukee still had the greatest racial disparity in home loan denial rates of the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the United States.\(^{17}\) Moreover, the data paradoxically showed that the racial denial rates disparity for residential loans generally increased as incomes rose. “In the Milwaukee Metro Area, the racial denial disparity between non-white and white applicants rises from 1.6 for applicants with incomes under 50% of metro area median income to 2.7 for

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applicants with incomes over 120% of metro area median income.”18 What’s more, relatively affluent non-whites (income more than 120% of metro area median) incurred 50% higher loan denial rates than did relatively lower-income whites (income between 50-79% of metro median), and about the same denial rate as very low income whites (income less than 50% of metro area median).19 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the overwhelming majority of home purchase loans made in the Milwaukee suburbs in the 1990s (over 98%) were extended to white, non-Hispanic applicants—a pattern that insured the reproduction of residential segregation in metro Milwaukee.20

Second, the political climate of Milwaukee’s suburbs has also played a role in maintaining this entrenched pattern of racial segregation. The historical legacy of housing discrimination and resistance to desegregation in Milwaukee and its environs has been well established in the literature.21 A vivid and more recent example of this climate came in May 2010 when, after years of pressure from fair housing groups, the City of New Berlin (in suburban Waukesha County) narrowly approved an affordable housing project for the community. Initially supported by the mayor, the New Berlin plan nevertheless generated intense and racially tinged community opposition. As one lawsuit put it: “Mayor Chioverato was fully aware that opposition from members of the public to MSP’s development had a very substantial racial component...He was berated and vilified both publicly and privately for having supported the development. The racial underpinnings of much of the opposition was indicated by, among other things, a sign left facing his home, calling the mayor a ‘nigger lover.’ Opponents of the development, knowing that Mayor Chioverato had been adopted as a child, even took the step of sending someone to check public records to see if he had any ‘African-American blood.’”22

In June 2011 the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) sued New Berlin for violations of the federal Fair Housing Act, arguing that the suburban community killed the affordable housing project “because of race and because of community opposition that city officials understood to be based on the race and on racial stereotypes of the

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18 Ibid. p. 12. In this regard, Milwaukee varies considerably from the national norm: “Nationally, the loan disparity rate changes little from lowest to highest income applicants.”
19 Ibid.
prospective tenants of affordable housing.”23 The DOJ suit described the political climate in New Berlin this way:

Some of the opposition was based in part on fear that prospective tenants would be African American or minority. The Mayor, Aldermen, Plan Commissioners and staff at DCD were aware that community opposition was based in part on race. The communications they received over several weeks contained express and implied racial terms that were derogatory and based on stereotypes of African American residents. These communications references “niggers,” “white flight,” “crime,” “drugs,” “gangs,” “families with 10 or 15 kids,” of “slums,” of not wanting New Berlin to turn into “Milwaukee,” of moving to New Berlin “to get away from the poor people.”24

Consequently, Mayor Chiovatero withdrew his support for the project, stating: “I am a prisoner in my own home...Our City is filled with prejudice and bigoted people who with very few facts are marking this project into something evil and degrading...New Berlin is not ready, nor may never be, for a project like this.”25

The DOJ and New Berlin settled the case in April 2012, clearing the way for the affordable housing project, as well as requiring “that the city take affirmative steps to provide for future affordable housing, communicate its commitment to fair housing and establish a mechanism to ensure open and fair housing in New Berlin.”26 But the New Berlin episode provided a vivid illustration of the social and political forces maintaining the hypersegregation of metro Milwaukee’s suburbs.27

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24 Ibid. p. 6.
25 Ibid.
27 As an aftermath to the project, a recall campaign was launched against Chiovatero and a New Berlin alderman, targeted because “they aren’t working for the will of the people” – even though, by this time, Chiovatero was firmly opposed to the affordable housing project. The recall eventually fizzled. See Mike Johnson, “Citizens group to target New Berlin mayor, alderman for recall,” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 24, 2010. Although the recall effort dissipated, Chiovatero was soundly defeated when he ran for re-election in 2013. See Jane Ford-Stewart, “New Berlin voters decisively opt for new mayor in Ament,” New Berlin Now, 2 April 2013. Accessed at: http://www.newberlinnow.com/news/201176511.html
Poverty, Income, and Education

Metropolitan Milwaukee is marked by deep racial and ethnic disparities in poverty and income. As Table 2 shows, median black household income in Milwaukee was just $26,036 in 2012; this ranked 37th among the nation’s 40 largest metropolitan areas. Hispanic median household income was $34,894, which ranked 34th among 36 of the nation’s metropolitan areas for which data are available. By contrast, white median household income in metro Milwaukee ($62,100) ranked 20th among the nation’s 40 largest metro areas.

Black median household income is just 41.9% of the white median, a racial gap that places Milwaukee 39th among the nation’s 40 largest metropolitan areas. The Hispanic percentage of white household income (56.2%) ranks Milwaukee 27th among 36 of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas for which data are available. Milwaukee is clearly a region with among the deepest levels of racial and ethnic income disparities in the country.

Table 2:

Racial and Ethnicity Disparities in Income in Metropolitan Milwaukee: 2012

Median household income, by race and ethnicity, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Median HH Income</th>
<th>As % of White HH income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Non-Hispanic</td>
<td>$62,100</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>$26,036</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>$34,894</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Metro Milwaukee is also characterized by exceptionally high rates of minority group poverty, and a huge gulf in white-minority poverty rates, a phenomenon intimately linked to the entrenched hypersegregation noted earlier. According to the 2012 *American Community Survey*, Milwaukee reported a black poverty rate of 39.2 percent: this is the second highest black rate of poverty among the nation’s 40 largest metropolitan areas. The Hispanic poverty rate was 29.9 percent, ranking Milwaukee 7th highest among the 36 of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas for

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28 U.S Bureau of the Census, *American Community Survey*, 2012 estimates, Table S0201
which data were available.\textsuperscript{29} By contrast, the white poverty rate in metro Milwaukee in 2012 was 8.0 percent, which ranked 25\textsuperscript{th} among the nation’s 40 largest metro areas.

These differing rates translate into huge racial and ethnic disparities. Thus, the black poverty rate in Milwaukee was 4.9 times the white rate, the second worst disparity of among the 40 largest metro areas in the nation. The ratio of Hispanic poverty to white poverty was 3.7 in Milwaukee; this was the seventh worst disparity among the large metropolitan areas.

Not only do metro Milwaukee’s minority communities report high levels of poverty and wide racial disparities in poverty rates, but, as a consequence of hypersegregation here, a high proportion of Milwaukee’s minorities live in conditions of \textit{concentrated} or \textit{extreme} poverty – defined by urban sociologists as neighborhoods in which the poverty rate is over 40 percent. Scholars such as William Julius Wilson, Douglas Massey, Robert Sampson, and Paul Jargowsky have all noted the especially deleterious socioeconomic, cultural, and political consequences of extreme, concentrated poverty.\textsuperscript{30} As a recent Brookings Institution study put it: “Why does concentrated poverty matter? Being poor in a very poor neighborhood subjects residents to costs and limitations above and beyond the burdens of individual poverty.”\textsuperscript{31} As Jargowsky puts it: “In these poorest neighborhoods the poverty rate exceeds 40 percent, and opportunities for successful social and economic contacts are few. The problem is exacerbated as families and businesses with better prospects relocate out of impoverished inner-city neighborhoods, leaving many cities with abandoned and decaying cores.”\textsuperscript{32}

Jargowsky’s research found that by 1990 Milwaukee led the nation in the percentage of the region’s black population living in extreme poverty neighborhoods: 47.0 percent. 64.3 percent of poor blacks lived in extreme poverty neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{33} Those rates have come down over the past twenty years: in 2010, 33 percent of all Milwaukee blacks lived in extreme poverty neighborhoods, while 45 percent of poor blacks lived in such neighborhoods. But the rates remain high,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Elizabeth Kneebone, Carey Nadeau, and Alan Berube, \textit{The Re-Emergence of Concentrated Poverty: Metropolitan Trends in the 2000s}, The Brookings Institution, November 2011, p. 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Jargowsky, \textit{Poverty and Place}, p. 1
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Jargowsky, \textit{Poverty and Place}, pp. 49-57.
\end{itemize}
among the highest in the country, and, in fact, increased during the economically difficult decade of 2000-2010.34

Moreover, the disparity between whites and blacks in metro Milwaukee living in extreme poverty is enormous. While 32.9 percent of Milwaukee blacks live in concentrated poverty neighborhoods, only 1.6 percent of whites do – a staggering 20 to 1 ratio. 13.7 percent of Milwaukee Hispanics live in extreme poverty neighborhoods, over eight times the white rate.

Put another way, although blacks and Hispanics make up 23 percent of metro Milwaukee’s population, they comprise 86.1 percent of all Milwaukeeans living in extreme poverty neighborhoods.

Concentrated poverty, hypersegregation, and racial disparities in poverty rates have also combined to produce conditions of intense poverty for minorities in public schools in metro Milwaukee. As UWM researchers have documented, “what makes Milwaukee unique in the state of Wisconsin...is its concentration of poverty in the schools. Where suburban schools –even those with open enrollment and Chapter 220 transfer students—typically have less than 25% of their students from impoverished families...the city most typically has schools where a substantial majority of students are impoverished (and have been so for long periods of time).” 92 percent of MPS students attend a school where over half the children are poor, compared to only 4 percent of children in suburban schools in the four-county Milwaukee metro area enrolled in such high poverty schools.35

Thus, in 2009-2010, the average black primary school student in metro Milwaukee attended a school in which 78.1 percent of the students were poor, the 10th highest poverty rate for black students among the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas. The average Hispanic student attended a school in which 70.5 percent of the students were poor, the 29th highest rate among the 100 metros. By contrast, the average white primary school student in metro Milwaukee attended a school in which 24.2 percent of the students were poor – this is the 9th lowest rate of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the country. Consequently, the minority-white disparity in school poverty in Milwaukee ranks among the widest in the country.36

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34 Data from American Community Survey 5-year data (2006-10). If we look at the percentage of minorities living in very high poverty census tracts (30% poverty or higher in the tract), over half of metro Milwaukee’s black population (53.2%) and over one-third of the Hispanic population (36.0%) lived in neighborhoods of extreme poverty and those just under the threshold for “extreme” poverty. By contrast, only 4.2% of Milwaukee’s white population lived in census tracts in which the poverty rate was 30% or higher.
In light of these racial and ethnic disparities in overall poverty rates and income inequality as well as school poverty, it is small wonder that metro Milwaukee’s minority-white school achievement gaps are among the largest in the nation. A deep vein of academic research has documented the primordial connection between poverty and educational outcomes. Thus, a recent Brookings Institution study documents that Milwaukee registered in 2010 the second widest black-white school test score gap among the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas (only Buffalo was worse). The Latino-white test score gap in Milwaukee ranked 14th among the 100 metro areas. In an average high-performing school in metro Milwaukee—those in the top quintile of standardized test scores—the student body was only 5 percent black and 3 percent Latino. In an average “bottom quintile” school, the student body was 76 percent black and 15 percent Latino—a percentage four times greater than the minority share of metro Milwaukee’s population. In short, hypersegregation and concentrated neighborhood poverty in Milwaukee have combined to produce segregated schools marked by extreme poverty and wide racial disparities in educational achievement.

Metro Milwaukee is also marked by massive racial and ethnolinguistic disparities in educational attainment. Almost 44 percent of non-Hispanic whites over the age of 25 in the region held an associate’s or college degree in 2010; by contrast, only 19.4 percent of blacks and 16.2 percent of Hispanics held such post-secondary degrees.

**Employment Disparities**

A series of studies over the past decade have documented the magnitude of joblessness among Milwaukee’s minorities, especially for African American males, as well as racial disparities in employment that have grown wider than in any metropolis in the nation.

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39 Ibid.
40 *American Community Survey 2008-2010 3-Year Estimates*, Table B 150021
No metro area has witnessed more precipitous erosion in the labor market for black males over the past 40 years than has Milwaukee. Once a region posting black male employment rates above the national average, by the end of the 20th century Milwaukee’s black male employment rate had plummeted to among the lowest in the country. According to the most recent census data, just 47.6 percent of metro Milwaukee’s working-age black males (those between the ages of 16-64) were employed in 2012. Only Detroit, among 40 large benchmark metropolitan areas analyzed, reported lower black male employment rates in 2012 than did Milwaukee. Moreover, with a white male employment rate of 80.0 percent in 2012, Milwaukee also registered, by several percentage points, the largest racial disparity in employment rates for males (32.4 percentage points) of any metropolitan area in the country (see Table 3).

Table 3:
Racial Disparities in Male Employment Rates in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2012
Percentage of working-age (16-64) males employed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metro Area</th>
<th>Black Males Percent Employed</th>
<th>White Non-Hispanic Males Percent Employed</th>
<th>Percent Gap in Black/White Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaha</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartford</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raleigh</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jacksonville 54.6 70.5 15.9
Columbus 59.6 75.0 15.4
Charlotte 61.9 77.3 15.4
Virginia Beach 64.3 79.7 15.4
Miami 58.2 72.7 14.6
Las Vegas 55.3 69.7 14.4
Atlanta 61.4 75.7 14.3
San Diego 59.7 73.9 14.2
Nashville 62.0 76.1 14.2
Dallas 64.6 78.6 14.0
Denver 65.6 79.2 13.6
Seattle 63.0 75.5 12.6
Washington 67.8 79.9 12.1
Boston 66.8 77.1 10.2
Phoenix 64.4 73.4 9.0


The employment rate for working age Hispanic males in Milwaukee in 2012 stood at 72.9 percent – substantially higher than the black rate, but a rate that nevertheless placed Milwaukee only 24th in Hispanic male employment rates among the 38 large benchmark metropolitan areas for which data were available in 2012.

By way of contrast, the employment rate of 80.0 percent registered by working-age white males in Milwaukee in 2012 placed the metro area third among the nation’s largest metro areas.

In summary: the contrast could not be starker. According to the most recent labor market data available, the Milwaukee black male employment rate ranks second lowest in the United States, while the white male employment rate ranks third highest.

Several factors explain these patterns in male employment: hypersegregation and differential access to labor market opportunities; the geography of regional economic growth (all job growth occurring in suburbs and exurbs inaccessible from inner city neighborhoods where most Milwaukee minorities live); and racial and ethnic disparities in educational attainment (variations in human capital).42

The legacy of historical labor market discrimination, and the “path dependency” that has flowed from those initial conditions, has also undoubtedly shaped these disparities.43 But persistent patterns of labor market discrimination in Milwaukee

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42 Ibid. pp. 32-35.
also remain part of the equation. For example, in a study of the New York City labor market, using an “experimental audit” methodology, in which testers of different races but with identical qualifications apply for jobs, Princeton sociologist Devah Pager and colleagues found strong bias against black men for service sector jobs. In the New York experiment, black applicants were half as likely as equally qualified whites to receive a callback or a job offer. Moreover, white testers were frequently encouraged to apply for better positions (especially those involving more public contact), while no black testers received such suggestions. On the contrary, black testers were often “channeled down,” offered positions less advanced than the one for which they had applied. Thus, Pager and colleagues conclude that “these results point to the subtle yet systematic forms of discrimination that continue to shape employment opportunities for low-wage workers.”

These findings dovetail with Pager’s similar early 2000s field experiment in Milwaukee, in which she found, for pairs of testers for whom the only meaningful differences were race and a fictional criminal record, that whites without a criminal record had a 34 percent callback rate, compared to 14 percent for blacks without a criminal record (about the same percentages as found in the New York City experiment). Whites with a criminal record had a callback rate of 17 percent, three times the callback rate (5 percent) for blacks with criminal records, and, more strikingly, a callback rate higher than for equivalently qualified black applicants without records. Pager concluded that “employers, at least in Milwaukee, continue to use race as a major factor in their hiring decisions.”

Racial disparities in employment rates among females are equally stark in Milwaukee. As Table 4 shows, the black-white employment gap among working-age (16-64) females in Milwaukee in 2012 was the largest in the country (at 20.6 percentage points). The Milwaukee black female employment rate of 53.9 percent was the third lowest among the 40 large benchmark metro areas analyzed; by contrast, the percentage of working-age females employed was 74.5 percent – the second highest rate in the country. At 56.8 percent, the Hispanic female employment rate in Milwaukee ranked 25th among the 38 large benchmark metropolitan areas for which data were available in 2012.

Minority Business Ownership

Studies have consistently shown that Milwaukee lags far behind other metropolitan areas in the rate of minority business ownership in the region. This is an important factor not only for wealth creation in minority communities, but also business development linkages in minority neighborhoods, and for minority employment (as minority-owned firms employ a disproportionately larger number of minority workers than do other firms).

Table 4:
Racial Disparities in Female Employment Rates in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2012
Percentage of working-age (16-64) females employed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metro Area</th>
<th>Black Females Percent Employed</th>
<th>White Non-Hispanic Females Percent Employed</th>
<th>Percent Gap in Black/White Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaha</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartford</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<td>Richmond</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>70.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonville</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raleigh</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Beach</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Milwaukee ranked dead last among the nation’s 50 largest metropolitan areas in the number of black-owned firms per 1,000 black population in 1992; and 48th out of the 50 in 1997.46 As for Hispanic-owned firms, Milwaukee ranked last in 1992 and 49th of 50 in 1997.

The most recent available data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census confirms that Milwaukee continues to lag other large metropolitan areas in the rate of minority business ownership. Although the absolute number of minority owned firms in metro Milwaukee doubled between 1997-2007, the rate of minority business ownership (the minority business participation rate), controlled for the size of a region’s minority population, remains dismal in Milwaukee. In 2007, among the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the country, Milwaukee ranked 48th in the number of black-owned businesses per 1,000 black residents (business participation rate), and last in the number of Hispanic-owned firms per 1,000 Hispanic residents in the region (for the 36 metro areas for which data were available).47 Clearly, to a degree greater than almost all metropolitan areas in the country, minorities in Milwaukee remain peripheral to the levers of economic control in the region.

**Race, Ethnicity, and Mass Incarceration**

Since the mid-1970s, for a variety of reasons, the incarceration rate in the United States has nearly quintupled, rising from 110 inmates per 100,000 persons to 507 inmates per 100,000 in 2007 (it has subsequently declined slightly to 497 per 100,000 in 2010).48 Incarceration has become so pervasive in the U.S. that it has become a “normal stage in the life course for many disadvantaged young men, with some segments of the population more likely to end up in prison than attend

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46 Marc V. Levine, _Minority Business Ownership in Metropolitan Milwaukee in the 1990s: Some Statistical Indicators and Comparisons to the Nation’s Largest Metropolitan Areas_ (UW-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, May 2001). Normalizing ownership rates per 1,000 is essential to control for differences in the size of minority populations in metro areas; ownership per 1,000 is known as the “business participation rate” (BPR).


college.” Scholars such as Harvard sociologist Bruce Western have labeled this state of affairs “mass incarceration.”

Mass incarceration in America, as Western and other scholars have documented, has a distinctly racial hue: African-American males, in particular, are disproportionately likely to be (or have been) incarcerated, and in cities such as Milwaukee, Baltimore and Chicago, studies have revealed that over 50 percent of young black males, concentrated in inner city neighborhoods, are either in prison or are ex offenders.

Wisconsin is a state with sharp racial disparities in incarceration rates. The most recent available data (2010) reveal that Wisconsin has the highest black male incarceration rate of any state in the nation (12.8 percent), more than double the rate in states such as New York and Minnesota, and nearly triple the rate in states such as Maryland or Massachusetts. What’s more, the data show that black males were incarcerated at 10.7 times the rate of whites in Wisconsin, the second highest racial disparity among states (only Minnesota’s ratio of black to white incarceration was higher). The 11.6 percentage point gap separating the rates of black and white males incarceration in Wisconsin (12.8 percent to 1.2 percent) is, by a large margin, the widest racial incarceration gap in the country.

These racial disparities, building on patterns of hypersegregation and extreme poverty noted earlier, show up in Milwaukee in what Harvard sociologist Robert Sampson has called “concentrated incarceration.” Over 40 percent of black males in Milwaukee County between the ages of 25-34 have spent time in the Wisconsin corrections system, compared to only 5 percent of whites and 5 percent of Hispanics. Concentrated incarceration overlaps with concentrated poverty: 67 percent of African Americans and 49 percent of Hispanics released from Wisconsin correctional institutions live in the poorest Milwaukee neighborhoods where, as one report put it, “combinations of race, transportation barriers, and educational levels further limit the labor market for the large number of those released to the poorest neighborhoods.” Moreover, as the Devah Pager study noted earlier concluded, black employment prospects in Milwaukee “may be more strongly affected by the

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51 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Group Quarters Population by Sex, Age, and Type of Quarters: 2010 Census Summary File 2, Table QT-P13
impact of a criminal record.”54 By contrast, only 16 percent of whites released from the DOC live in these high-poverty neighborhoods.

**Summary**

As the foregoing analysis makes clear, Wisconsin and Milwaukee’s black and Hispanic communities manifest deep and enduring socioeconomic effects of historic discrimination across a wide range of areas. Along a daunting array of dimensions, conveniently summarized in Table 5 below, the state and its largest metropolitan center display overwhelming patterns of racial inequality, racial disparities, and racially-based socioeconomic distress: most segregated metropolitan area in the nation, widest racial income gap, second highest black poverty rate, among the highest levels of concentrated poverty in neighborhoods and schools, second lowest rate of black male employment, third lowest rate of female unemployment, second widest racial gap in school test scores, third lowest rate of minority business ownership, worst racial disparities in incarceration rates. Minority communities in Wisconsin and metro Milwaukee (where 80 percent of the state’s black population lives and 45 percent of the state’s Latino population resides) clearly bear the socioeconomic effects of racial inequities, which hinder their ability to participate in the political process on an equal basis with other members of the electorate.

**Table 5:**

**Summary of Racial and Ethnic Socioeconomic Disparities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/Issue</th>
<th>Metro Milwaukee/Wisconsin Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Residential Segregation</td>
<td>Worst in nation of 102 largest metro areas (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic-White Residential Segregation</td>
<td>9	extsuperscript{th} worst in nation (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White School Attendance Segregation</td>
<td>2	extsuperscript{nd} worst in nation of 100 largest metros (2009-2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic-White School Segregation</td>
<td>8	extsuperscript{th} worst in nation (2009-2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Income Inequality</td>
<td>Black HH income 42% of white; second lowest ratio (ranks 39	extsuperscript{th} of 40) in the U.S. (2012) among 40 large benchmark metropolitan areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic-White Income Inequality</td>
<td>Hispanic HH income 56% of white; ratio ranks 27	extsuperscript{th} among 36 large metros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Poverty</td>
<td>Poverty rate 39.2%, 2	extsuperscript{nd} highest among 40 large benchmark metropolitan areas (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Poverty Disparity</td>
<td>Black rate 4.9x greater than white – largest disparity among 40 metros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Poverty</td>
<td>Rate of 29.9%; 7	extsuperscript{th} highest among 36 metros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic-White Poverty Disparity</td>
<td>Hispanic rate 3.7x greater than white – 7	extsuperscript{th} worst disparity among 40 metros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Extreme Poverty</td>
<td>33% of Milwaukee black population lives in extreme poverty census tracts (2006-10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

54 Devah Pager, “The Mark of a Criminal Record.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black-White Extreme Poverty Disparity</th>
<th>Black rate 20x greater than white</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Extreme Poverty</td>
<td>13% of Milwaukee Hispanic population lives in extreme poverty census tracts (2006-10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate of Schools Attended by Average Black Student</td>
<td>78.1% -- the 10th highest rate for blacks among the 100 largest metros in U.S. (2009-2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate of Schools Attended by Average Hispanic Student</td>
<td>70.5%-- the 29th highest rate for Hispanics among the 100 largest metropolitan areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate of Schools Attended by Average White Student</td>
<td>24.2%-- the 91st highest rate for whites among the 100 largest metropolitan areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-white school test score gap</td>
<td>2nd highest among 100 largest metros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic-white school test score gap</td>
<td>14th highest among 100 largest metros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male employment rate (ages 16-64)</td>
<td>47.6% -- 2nd lowest in country among 40 benchmark large metropolitan areas (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-white male employment disparity (ages 16-64)</td>
<td>32.4 percentage points – widest racial gap in employment rates among 40 metros (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic male employment rate (ages 16-64)</td>
<td>72.9% - ranked 24th of 38 large metro areas with available data (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black female employment rate (ages 16-64)</td>
<td>53.9% -- 3rd lowest in country (among 40 benchmark metros, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-white female employment disparity (ages 16-64)</td>
<td>20.6 percentage points – largest gap in the country (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic female employment rate</td>
<td>56.8% -- ranked 25th of 38 large metro areas with available data (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-owned businesses per 1,000 black residents (Business participation rate-BPR)</td>
<td>48th among 50 largest metropolitan areas (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic-owned businesses per 1,000 Hispanic residents (BPR)</td>
<td>Worst in nation among 36 benchmark large metropolitan areas (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-white disparity in incarceration rates</td>
<td>Wisconsin ranks worst in country; widest % gap (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Voter ID, Race and Socioeconomic Status, and Political Participation**

There is a vast body of academic research on how socioeconomic status (SES) affects political participation, especially voting behavior. In their classic book, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*, Verba and colleagues outline the critical roles that resources, political will/engagement, and recruitment play in driving political participation.\(^{55}\) Political participation is more difficult for some people than for others, regardless of their interest in politics or whether they are “recruited” by political campaigns. And research suggests that greater access to particular resources, such as higher SES or education, facilitates political participation; on the other hand, those lacking resources will be less likely to participate in politics, including voting in elections.\(^{56}\)


Thus, there is substantial research showing that those with lower SES are likelier not to vote than more affluent citizens.\textsuperscript{57} Wolfinger and Rosenstone, for example argue that voters who are insecure in their basic needs are less interested in politics; they have more pressing concerns. Consequently, they are less likely to vote than those with higher incomes. In addition, there are numerous studies correlating higher education with higher political participation, and employment with voting behavior: “the expectation is that citizens who are not in the paid labor force are more likely to be non-voters than those who are in the paid workforce.”\textsuperscript{58} These disparities in political participation by SES have profound consequences for democracy: as research by Princeton University political scientist Martin Gilens has revealed, “when Americans with different income levels differ in their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear virtually no relationship to the preferences of poor or middle-income Americans. The vast discrepancy...in government responsiveness to citizens with different incomes stands in stark contrast to the idea of political equality Americans hold dear.”\textsuperscript{59}

In addition to a “resources/SES” perspective in explaining voting behavior, a different but complementary angle focuses on the costs and benefits of voting. As Marjorie Randon Hershey of Indiana University puts it: “People are more likely to vote if the benefits they expect to receive from voting (their expected utility) are greater than the costs. A great deal of research shows that voter turnout declines as the costs of voting increase, and that even small increases in cost may make a real difference in turnout rates.”\textsuperscript{60}

Thus, the pervasive racial disparities and racially-based socioeconomic distress in Milwaukee and Wisconsin delineated in this report provide compelling evidence of the kinds of resource discrepancies likely to impede full and equal participation in the electoral process. As Hershey notes, “the costs of voting fall more heavily on


some subgroups than on others and therefore reduce the voter turnout of those
groups disproportionately." Given that "even small increases in cost may make a
real difference in turnout rates," especially for resource-disadvantaged populations,
what is the likelihood that the application of the voter ID law in Wisconsin under Act
23 will deter or prevent black and Hispanic citizens from voting?

There are several reasons to believe that Wisconsin’s voter ID law will present
new barriers to political participation that disproportionately and deleteriously
affect disadvantaged minority communities. The political science literature on the
“costs of voting” reveals that requirements ranging from advance registration to
strict voter-ID laws “do reduce voter turnout to some degree and that the impact
seems to fall disproportionately on the least educated and the least wealthy.” The
literature on the impact of voter ID laws on turnout is neither vast nor definitive,
given the recentness of many of the laws as well as the complexity in controlling for
the full range of factors, including change in legal regime, that affect voter turnout. Yet, there is persuasive evidence suggesting that voter ID requirements have
depressed turnout and, as statistician Nate Silver has argued, “although the effects
[of voter ID laws] seem to be small, and although their precise magnitude is
uncertain, the position that they don’t have any effect at all is hard to defend.” The
most extensive study, by Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz (2008), found that stricter rules –
the combination of having to present an ID and a signature match, and the photo-ID
requirement—did depress the turnout of registered voters relative to the
requirement of stating one’s name at the polls. Although the Alvarez, Bailey, and
Katz study (using individual-level, CPS data) did not find a specific disproportionate
racial effect of strict voter ID laws over four election cycles between 2000-2006
(controlling for socioeconomic status), they did find that “voters with lower levels of
income of all racial/ethnic groups are less likely to vote, the more restrictive the
voter identification regime.” Their controls for SES, though, obscure the potential
racial consequences of voter ID laws as the “disproportionate effect of stricter voter
ID rules on blacks may well reflect the fact that blacks tend to be lower in SES.”

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62 Ibid. p. 90.
64 Nate Silver, “Measuring the Effects of Voter Identification Laws,” The New York Times, July 15,
2012
65 R. Michael Alvarez, Delia Bailey, and Jonathan N. Katz, “The Effect of Voter Identification Laws on
67 Hershey, “What we Know about Voter-ID Laws, Registration, and Turnout”: 90. Another study, less
rigorous than Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz and examining only the 2004 presidential election, found that
identification laws reduced the probability of voting by about 10 percent for Hispanics, 6 percent for
African Americans, and 2 percent for white voters. Timothy Vercellotti and David Anderson,
“Protecting the franchise, or restricting it? The effects of voter identification requirements on
turnout,” Paper presented at meetings of American Political Science Association, September 3, 2006,
p. 13. In addition a recent paper by political scientist Kyle A. Dropp, using the massive national
As we have seen, to a degree as extreme as anywhere in the United States, the overlap between minority communities and low SES in Milwaukee and Wisconsin is especially strong, across virtually all indicators. Thus, to the extent that voter ID inhibits the voter turnout of low SES citizens, it is likely to disproportionately affect Milwaukee’s and Wisconsin’s black and Hispanic communities. This likely impact from racial and socioeconomic disparities can be discerned in the degree to which: a) minorities currently hold government identification that would be required for voting under Act 23; and b) minorities have access to the documentation that would be necessary to secure such identification.

Studies of Indiana and Georgia, two states with stringent voter ID laws, show that blacks and Latinos were less likely to possess the necessary identification to vote (especially driver’s licenses), even after controlling for income, age, and residential differences. A widely cited 2005 study by the UW-Milwaukee Employment and Training Institute found that while 83 percent of Wisconsin whites held a valid driver’s license, slightly fewer than half of blacks and Latinos did. For young men, the disparity was especially striking: while 64 percent of Wisconsin white men ages 18-24 held valid drivers’ licenses, only 22 percent of young black males and 43 percent of young Hispanic males had a valid license.

A 2012 survey of eligible voters in Milwaukee similarly found that 14.9 percent of Latino eligible voters lacked an accepted form of photo ID (mandated by Act 23), 13.2 percent of African American eligible voters lacked such an ID, compared to only 7.3 percent of white eligible voters. Put another way, black and Latinos are twice as likely as whites to lack accepted identification. An estimated 28,000 black and Latino citizens, “who are otherwise eligible to vote, will not have access to the ballot box because they do not possess an accepted photo ID as defined by current Wisconsin law.”

Catalist registered voter database, and analyzing the impact of voter ID statutes across a wider array of cases and over a longer time period than previous studies, found: 1)“Among states that changed their policy between 2006 and 2010, Voter ID laws disproportionately demobilize poor and working class voters” (p.23); and 2)“Voter ID laws cause an approximately 2 percentage point decrease among African Americans while not affecting turnout among white Americans between November 2004 and November 2010.” Kyle A. Dropp, "Voter ID Laws and Voter Turnout," Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2012.

70 Ibid. p. 5.
Moreover, the Barreto and Sanchez survey reveals that not only are blacks and Latinos statistically less likely than whites to possess the photo ID required for voting by Act 23, but they also are “less likely to possess all three of the necessary underlying documents [proof of citizenship, identity, and residency] to acquire such ID. Essentially, African American and Latino eligible voters are doubly impacted by the voter ID law, not only in terms of current possession of ID, but also in the means to obtain an accepted photo ID.” As just one example of the impediment to voting imposed by Act 23 on low-income, minority communities, they point out the high percentage of blacks and Latinos born outside of the state of Wisconsin, which would require, for instance, navigating the bureaucracy of a state or jurisdiction outside Wisconsin, simply to obtain documentation necessary to then obtain a voter ID.\(^\text{72}\) It is not too much of an inferential leap to predict, given the “cost of voting” model noted earlier, that a non-trivial number of otherwise eligible, “resource-disadvantaged” minority voters will be discouraged by these additional steps to exercising their franchise.

These Milwaukee and Wisconsin data are broadly consistent with recent data from around the county. The North Carolina State Board of Elections, for example, conducted a “matching analysis” between voter registration and DMV databases, to estimate how many voters from the 2012 general election did not have a state-issued ID (North Carolina’s strict voter ID law was not in effect for the 2012 election). The North Carolina analysis showed clearly the disparate impact of voter ID requirements on non-white voters. Non-whites constituted 46 percent of “unmatched” 2012 voters (i.e. voters without DMV photo ID) while representing 30 percent of all registered voters; African Americans represented 36 percent of 2012 voters without state-issued IDs, while making up 23 percent of registered voters in the state.\(^\text{73}\)

A national survey conducted by political scientists Jon C. Rogowski and Cathy J. Cohen after the 2012 election found that while fewer than five percent of young (ages 18-29) white nonvoters said they were deterred from voting by voter identification requirements, 17.3 percent of young black and 8.1 percent of young Latino nonvoters said that ID requirements kept them from voting.\(^\text{74}\) Moreover, the survey found that “across all four types of ID – driver’s license, birth certification, U.S. passport, and a college ID card that includes a photo and a signature—rates of possession were lower among black and Latino youth than they are for white

\(^{72}\) Ibid. p. 23-24.


Finally, Rogowski and Cohen found troubling evidence of racially disparate “administrative discretion” in the application of voter ID laws: in states with such laws, black youth were about 10 percentage points more likely than whites to be required to show identification76 -- the kind of administrative disparity that even political scientists skeptical of the impact of voter ID on turnout acknowledge could have a deleterious effect on equal participation in elections.77

In sum, metro Milwaukee and the state of Wisconsin are rife, in the extreme, with the racially based socioeconomic distress and daunting litany of racial and ethnic disparities targeted in Senate Factor Five of the VRA. These racial socioeconomic factors represent resource deficiencies that political scientists agree impede full participation of low-income minorities in the electoral process. In addition, disadvantaged groups are particularly likely to have their participation depressed when the “costs” of voting are high, or are increased. Voter ID laws, such as Act 23, impose such costs. Act 23 makes requirements (photo ID) that a disproportionate number of otherwise eligible minority voters do not meet. Surveys of photo ID possession rates (State of North Carolina; Rogowski and Cohen; and Barreto and Sanchez) consistently confirm racial disparities. Moreover, given the challenges that resource-disadvantaged minorities without photo IDs face in securing the documentation necessary to obtain an ID, Act 23 imposes a double roadblock on voting for substantial numbers of eligible voters from communities that have borne the historical and contemporary legacy of discrimination and entrenched inequality.

As Alexander Keyssar, a Harvard University expert on the history of voting rights, has written:

The targets of exclusionary laws have tended to be similar for more than two centuries: the poor, immigrants, African-Americans, people perceived to be something other than “mainstream” Americans.

The current wave of procedural restrictions on voting, including strict photo ID requirements, ought to be understood as the latest chapter in a not always uplifting story: Americans of both parties have sometimes rejected democratic values or preferred partisan advantage to fair democratic processes. Acknowledging the realities of our history should lead us all to be profoundly skeptical of laws that burden, or impede, the exercise of what Lyndon B. Johnson called “the basic right, without which all others are meaningless.”78

75 Ibid, p. 5.
76 Ibid, p. 3.
Section II: Racialized Politics in Milwaukee and Wisconsin

Senate Factor Six of the VRA calls for assessment of “whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals.”

The injection of race into political campaigns may take several forms. There may be explicit racial appeals – the rhetoric of openly segregationist governors in the 1960s, for example, or expressions of overt racism-- or more “oblique” but unquestionably racial appeals such as a white mayoral candidate running against a black and running advertisements that call for voters to support him, “before it’s too late.” Candidates may also more subtly racially “prime” voters, by running political ads feeding racial stereotypes-- the infamous “Willie Horton” ad of the 1988 presidential campaign is a classic example—or by running on “neutral” campaign issues that play into racial stereotypes (i.e. running campaign ads on “wasteful government spending,” showing images of predominantly black inner city neighborhoods). Princeton University political scientist Tali Mendleberg has identified 17 public opinion research studies documenting the racial effects of racial cues in campaigns since the early 1990s. The use of “coded” language has been an especially effective way of smuggling racial appeals into political campaigns. As Princeton’s Martin Gilens has observed: “Political issues such as crime and welfare are now widely viewed as ‘coded’ issues that play upon race (or, more specifically, on white Americans negative views of blacks) without explicitly raising the ‘race card.’ Many believe that by engaging such issues, politicians can exploit whites’ racial animosity and resentment while diminishing the appearance of race baiting.”

In an astonishingly frank interview, national Republican Party operative Lee Atwater bluntly revealed how racialized appeals had morphed from overt to coded in political strategy over the years:

You start out in 1954 by saying “nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968, you can’t say “nigger” – that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff. You’re getting so abstract now [that] you’re talking about cutting taxes...Obviously sitting around saying “we want to cut this” is much more abstract than even the busing thing and a hell of a lot more abstract than “nigger, nigger.”

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In 2005, in fact, the then-chair of the Republican National Committee apologized to the NAACP national convention, meeting in Milwaukee, for years of “trying to benefit politically from racial polarization,” in the manner described by Atwater. “I am here today as the Republican chairman to tell you we were wrong.”

Milwaukee and Wisconsin have a long history of such racialized politics. What follows is a brief overview of some examples.

In the 1950s, racial issues figured prominently in political campaigns against Milwaukee Mayor Frank P. Zeidler. The Mayor faced intense opposition to his public housing policies, with “whispering campaigns,” accompanied by overt racial epithets and innuendo, asserting that Zeidler was building such housing to attract “Negroes” to Milwaukee and that there should be “time limits” for living in public housing. These racial tensions came to head in the 1956 mayoral campaign, when Alderman Milton McGuire ran against Zeidler in a highly racialized campaign. A few days before the 1956 election, a McGuire advertisement ran in the city’s newspapers, widely viewed as raising the racialized specter of Zeidler’s Milwaukee out of control, with teenage “hoodlum mobs...ranging Milwaukee with wolfpack viciousness.” Although McGuire publicly disavowed the ad, the “whispering campaign” encouraged by his operatives continued, including false allegations that “Zeidler was plastering the South with billboards inviting Negroes to Milwaukee,” and that “Zeidler’s sister is married to a Negro.” McGuire’s aides were reported in the media as “sneering at Zeidler workers for associating with a ‘nigger lover.’”

The racial vitriol in Milwaukee was so intense that national media took notice: *Time* magazine published an article on the 1956 mayoral campaign entitled “The Shame of Milwaukee,” describing the “vicious rumor campaign against Zeidler.” In the end, Zeidler won re-election, but it was his last political campaign. Years later, in his memoirs, he wrote that he left politics, in part, because “the issue of whether or not I was ‘too friendly’ to minorities was once again going to be raised and I should have liked to have fought it out once more, but enough was enough.”

Milwaukee and Wisconsin also received national attention for surprisingly racialized politics in the 1960s and early 1970s, during Alabama Governor George C. Wallace’s campaigns for the presidency. Wallace came to Wisconsin in 1964 to run

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85 Ibid.
in the state’s presidential preference primary, and his campaign was overtly segregationist (“we believe in segregation and say so”) as he railed against federal civil rights legislation and state open housing laws. 89 Racial tensions surrounded Wallace’s rallies. 90 In the end, Wallace astounded national observers by winning 34 percent of the statewide vote against stand-in candidate Governor John Reynolds, and 38 percent of the vote in Milwaukee County; the Wallace vote was widely seen as demonstrating the power of his racialized appeal in the North and revealing the depths of an incipient Northern “white backlash” to civil rights. 91 Said Wallace after the primary: “If I ever had to leave Alabama, I’d want to live on the south side of Milwaukee.” 92 Wallace also ran in the 1972 Democratic primary in Wisconsin, finishing second in the state to George McGovern, but running strongly again on Milwaukee’s south side. By 1972, however, his campaign was more “coded” than “overt” (following the Atwater approach above): his main issues were taxes, and especially tax resentment at paying for “welfare loafers.” 93

In the aftermath of the racially tense late 1960s in the city, 94 Milwaukee politics endured a peculiarly racialized mayoral campaign in the mid 1970s, when, amidst a maelstrom of tension surrounding school desegregation, possible busing, and the recent memory of racial disturbances and open housing marches in the city, a Nazi candidate ran for mayor and received 5.5 percent of the vote in the primary. The Nazi (Arthur Jones) ran in 1976 as “the white people’s candidate,” and in his campaign hit on all the touchstones of the emerging white backlash in the city:

Are you fed up with runaway crime and unsafe streets?—with soaring property taxes—with bigger and bigger welfare handouts?—with forced busing and integrated jungles? With reverse discrimination in jobs and hiring?—with seeing white people pushed around?—with the same old, sell-out politicians? 95

A post-election survey of voters by UWM researchers found, incredibly, that Jones’ views were much more widely held than hypothesized; that a substantial portion of the so-called “extremists” voted for Mayor Henry Maier (favorably impressed with his coded rhetoric on “no coddling criminals”); and that “extremist

94 Jones, Selma of the North, pp. 1-8.
beliefs differed from general public opinion in Milwaukee only in shades” – that
there was a thin line separating “mainstream” politics and extremism in the city.96

In the 1980s, racialized politics persisted in Wisconsin, in less overt form, around
the “coded” issue of welfare reform.97 In the 1986 gubernatorial campaign, Tommy
Thompson made welfare cutting the cornerstone of his campaign. Although widely
disparaged in political circles at the time for his lack of inquisitiveness on matters of
public policy, Thompson ran on an issue that was gaining more and more currency
in Wisconsin political circles: that the state, with its generous benefits, had become a
“welfare magnet” and was a destination for “welfare migration.” 98 During the 1986
campaign incumbent Governor Tony Earl critically noted that “Tommy Thompson
wants to reform welfare and make Wisconsin like Mississippi.” Thompson’s
response: “With you in charge, we’re attracting all the people from Mississippi up
here anyway.”99

The Mississippi comment was fraught with racial coding. The vast majority of
Milwaukee blacks, from the 1930s through the 1990s, had been born out of state,
and the largest single source of black migration to Milwaukee was from
Mississippi.100 As noted earlier, anxieties about southern black migration to
Milwaukee had been stoked during Frank Zeidler’s mayoralty in the 1950s (public
housing generosity rather than welfare generosity was the alleged inducement then,
as well as apocryphal “recruiting” billboards). And in the 1960s, a report from
Mayor Henry Maier’s administration in Milwaukee asserted that black problems in
the city “derived from the large proportion originating from the rural South. The
study concluded that these young men, women, and their children did not know
how to live successfully in a large northern, urban, industrial city.”101 Language
about “attracting people from Mississippi,” then, tapped into a rich historical vein of

97 As Jason DeParle points out, in the aftermath of Milwaukee’s 1967 riots and general concerns
about “law and order,” discussion of cutting welfare benefits in Wisconsin in the early 1970s had an
explicit “ugly racial subtext.” See DeParle, American Dream: Three Women, Ten Kids, and the Nation’s
Drive to End Welfare (New York: Viking Books, 2004), p. 61. But the issue did not become a central
part of Wisconsin political discourse until the mid-1980s.
98 DeParle, American Dream, p. 62.
100 See Trotter, Black Milwaukee, p. 45; and Paul Geib, “From Mississippi to Milwaukee: A Case Study
of the Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 1940-1970,” The Journal of Negro History 83:4
(Autumn 1998): 229-248. Later policy advocacy reports, from the pro-Thompson and pro-welfare
reform Wisconsin Policy Research Institute, would provide data showing that almost one-fifth of
blacks living in Milwaukee in the mid-1990s had been born in Mississippi, and that Mississippi
migrants represented a leading category of “new nonresident” AFDC recipients Wisconsin in the mid-
Institute Report, February 1995, p. 6; and James W. Wahner and Jerome R. Stepaniak, “Welfare In-
racial anxieties in Milwaukee and Wisconsin about the migration of southern blacks to the state and city.

Thompson rode the issue of “welfare migration” to an upset victory and became known nationally as a welfare reformer with his “Wisconsin Works” (W-2) program, riding that reputation to four terms as governor. “It’s a fantastic campaign issue,” Thompson told The New York Times’ Jason DeParle in 1994 (emphasis added).102 Other Wisconsin politicians gravitated to the issue as well. “We like that it’s safe here, and we don’t want it to get less safe,” said Joseph A. Strohl, the Democratic majority leader in the Wisconsin Senate in 1989.103 The Mayor of Madison warned “against the ‘duplication of ghetto neighborhoods’ with the same problems that families came to Madison to escape.”104 By the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Lawrence Mead has pointed out, aggressive campaigning in Milwaukee and statewide in Wisconsin against welfare was widespread, even among some black politicians.105

But welfare was a campaign issue heavily freighted with racial subtexts and coded language. Welfare magnet, welfare migration, “attracting all the people from Mississippi” – all had undeniable racial coding attached. As Martin Gilens has written in his definitive review of survey data on attitudes about welfare policy: “Despite welfare’s formally race-neutral structure, beliefs about blacks are central in shaping white Americans’ view of welfare.”106 Whites’ welfare views were “strongly influenced by their perceptions of blacks and thus the popular belief that welfare is a ‘race coded’ issue appears warranted. Whatever other reasons whites may have for opposing welfare, their negative views of blacks appear to constitute an important factor in generating that opposition.”107

Since the 1990s, racial overtones –some overt, some coded-- have figured in several Milwaukee and Wisconsin campaigns. In a high-profile aldermanic race in the city of Milwaukee in 1989, a candidate’s campaign literature accused his opponent of wanting to open largely white areas of the district to minorities, and vowing not “to force people on people, nor...stop people from living where they want to.” The candidate was roundly condemned for “polluting politics with racist

102 Ibid. p. 74.
107 Gilens, “Race Coding’ White Opposition to Welfare”: 597.
fears.” A 1996 judicial race in Milwaukee County was also highly racialized, with campaigning marked by overtly racial cues. The white challenger, Robert Crawford, linked incumbent Russell Stamper to a “black militant” (Michael McGee) in Milwaukee who advocated the creation of a separate majority black city and the use of violence to receive more economic and political resources. Crawford also criticized Stamper’s support of electing judges by single-member districts rather than at large as racial gerrymandering, a term that has a negative racial connotation.  

Increasingly, however, racialized politics in the state and region took a more coded form. An example was the policy issue of whether to build a light rail transit system in the Milwaukee region. Favored by urban leaders such as the mayors of Milwaukee in the 1990s and 2000s, and pursued, in one form or another, in almost every other large metropolitan area in the country, opposition to light rail as a “taxpayer’s nightmare” and “billion dollar boondoggle” became a mantra for politicians in Milwaukee’s overwhelmingly white, hypersegregated suburban and exurban communities (as well as for a candidate for mayor of Milwaukee in 2000). As pro-light rail Mayor John Norquist put it: “The right-wing talk radio guys would always promote it to their listeners that somebody from the city would come out to the suburbs and steal their TV set...I think the Republicans from the suburbs around Milwaukee found light rail to be an issue that excited their base at election time, so they ended up running against it.” Suburban politicians such as Brookfield’s Scott Jensen, Waukesha’s Dan Finley, and Wauwatosa’s Scott Walker all incorporated opposition to light rail into their campaigns. And George Watts, an Ozaukee County resident, downtown Milwaukee merchant, and candidate for mayor of Milwaukee in 2000, based his campaign largely on opposition to light rail; earlier he had explicitly raised the largely suburban fears that “urban criminals could use the trains to prey on suburbanites” by saying that “light rail brings strangers who are not only a threat to your property, but to your children.” Transit advocates  

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described these references as “code words for race,” and in Milwaukee several black politicians decried Watt’s remark about “strangers” as a racial reference.\textsuperscript{114}

Although political rhetoric has become more coded in recent years – veiled references to “Milwaukee” by suburban politicians, especially around taxes and spending can be viewed in this regard\textsuperscript{115} – there nevertheless continue to be episodes of overt racialization in Wisconsin and Milwaukee-area politics. In the 2008 race for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, white challenger Michael Gableman ran an overtly racial campaign against the incumbent Louis Butler, an African American, accusing Butler of having worked as a public defender “to put criminals on the street,” including by finding “a loophole” to release a girl’s rapist. \textit{As the New York Times} has noted, “in addition to playing to the fear and racism of some voters, the charge was false.”\textsuperscript{116} Gableman ran television ads showing the rapist’s mug shot next to an image of Butler, with the question: “Can Wisconsin families feel safe with Louis Butler on the Supreme Court?” As a columnist for the \textit{Minneapolis Star-Tribune} noted: “In a reprise of the 1988 Willie Horton gambit, one vile ad for Gableman pictured Butler and a photo of a rapist whom Butler had defended while working as a public defender. No mention was made of any constitutional right to an attorney. Instead, the race-baiting ad made a visceral appeal to the worst elements of backwoods justice. Rapist? Black. Supreme Court justice? Black. Get it?”\textsuperscript{117}

In recent years there have also been a few examples in Wisconsin of coded political racialization involving Latinos, especially in Milwaukee’s western exurbs. In 1997, the Waukesha County Board, “shrugging off pleas not to be divisive,” passed, by a vote of 29-2, a resolution supporting adoption of English as the official language of Wisconsin. One supervisor remarked that he gets “upset” when he sees “people who can’t speak English” and have their “hands out for welfare.”\textsuperscript{118} In 2006, Waukesha County District Attorney and candidate for State Attorney General Paul Bucher ran, in part, on a platform of crackdowns on illegal immigration, requesting local immigration enforcement authority and running radio ads claiming that he was “the only candidate for Attorney general with a plan to deal with illegal immigrants who commit crimes.” “If you’re in this country illegally, and you commit

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{115} Thomas Edsall, for example, notes how in politics across the country “the meaning of ‘taxes’” has been transformed. “No longer the resource with which to create a beneficent federal government, taxes had come for many voters to signify the forcible transfer of hard-earned money away from those who worked, to those who did not.” \textit{Chain Reaction}, p. 214. The anti-Milwaukee rhetoric of suburban politicians such as Finley, Jensen, Walker, and, more recently, Waukesha mayor Jeff Scrima, can be viewed in this context.


\textsuperscript{117} Nick Coleman, “Dead Fish May Be Stinky, but this Judge’s Race Smells Worse,” \textit{Minneapolis Star-Tribune}, April 7, 2008. See also the disciplinary complaint filed against Gableman: \textit{In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman}, \textit{784 N.W. 2d} \textit{631 (2010)}, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, June 30, 2010

\textsuperscript{118} Mike Johnson, “Waukesha County Board backs ‘English only’ bill,” \textit{The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel}, April 26, 1997.
crimes,” said Bucher in the ad, “I say, start packing, you’re going home.””

Opponents criticized Bucher’s plan as divisive and even racist.

Also in 2006, gubernatorial candidate Mark Green aired a television ad against incumbent Jim Doyle claiming that “as illegal aliens stream in, [Doyle] actually wants to give them welfare and subsidized home loans” and “even wants to give illegal aliens in-state tuition breaks at the [University of Wisconsin], while Wisconsin kids are being turned away.”

The issue of voter fraud, as well as the emergence of voter ID as a policy issue in Wisconsin, fits into this historical pattern of racially coded politics. Despite the paucity of evidence of voting fraud in the state and the even more scant evidence “of any serious problem with voter impersonation fraud, the only form of illegal voting that a strict ID law could hope to address,” voter fraud and voter ID emerged as political issues in the 2000s. As Minnite points out, “the targeting is not overt, the language is rarely explicitly racial,” but the coding of voter fraud allegations is unmistakable: pointing “the finger at those belonging to the same categories of voters accused of fraud in the past – the marginalized and formerly disenfranchised, urban dwellers, immigrants, blacks, and lower status voters.”

In 2001, the Wisconsin Policy Research Institute began this kind of finger pointing, with an article noting the “unfortunate but true [sic] phenomenon that, historically, most cases of voter irregularities have arisen in regions that strongly support Democratic candidates, usually urban areas.” The article then offered anecdotal evidence of “multitudes of voting irregularities” that allegedly occurred in the razor-thin 2000 presidential election (Gore carried Wisconsin by 5,700 votes), all in Milwaukee, and few confirmed by subsequent investigations. “Ground zero for many of these election day follies,” claimed the article, “was the voting polls at the Highland Park public housing facility on North 17th street” – in the heart of

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120 Cited in In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Bettye Jones et al. v. Judge David G. Deininger et al., Defendants; Declaration of Barry C. Burden in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, April 23, 2012, p. 12.


122 Steven F. Huefner, Nathan A. Cemenska, Daniel P. Tokaji, and Edward P. Foley, From Registration to Recounts Revisited: The Election Ecosystems of Five Midwestern States, The Ohio State State University Moritz College of Law, 2011, p. 41. As the authors noted, “of the twenty individuals prosecuted for crimes arising out of the November 2008 election, none of them were accused of impersonating another voter.” Study accessed at: http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/projects/registration-to-recounts/2011edition.pdf

Milwaukee’s predominantly black inner city, as if the racial reference were not clear.124

Since 2000, stoked by right-wing talk radio and some political candidates, the coded (though sometimes overt) racial subtext of voter fraud and voter ID politics in Wisconsin has only grown. In 2004, top-rated Milwaukee talk radio host Mark Belling incited considerable controversy, using the word “wetback” to describe illegal Mexican immigrants on his show about potential voter fraud in Wisconsin. “You watch the voter turnout on the near south side, heavily Hispanic, and compare it to the voter turnout in any other election, and you’re going to see every wetback and every other non-citizen out there voting,” said Belling.125 In the aftermath of the 2004 presidential election, spurred by partisan allegations of widespread voter fraud, federal prosecutors indicted 14 individuals in Wisconsin for illegal voting (only five were convicted). All but one of those charged with felonies were African-American, and all were Milwaukee residents. “I definitely cannot say that this was any intent to suppress the black vote,” said Nancy Joseph, a federal public defender. “But I can say this: The state of Wisconsin is a predominantly white state. It was curious to me that the alleged voter fraud investigations were done in the city of Milwaukee, with Milwaukee residents.”126

In 2008, the “election fraud” issue took on racial tinges with Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen’s announcement, a week before the election, that he would dispatch 50 criminal prosecutors and special agents from the Division of Criminal Investigation to State polling places.127 At the same time, a brief filed by the Democratic National Committee claims that Van Hollen’s former staff, as partisan operatives, recruited additional individuals to intimidate voters.128 An e-mail from Jonathan Waclawski, Election Day Operations Director for the Republican Party of Wisconsin sought “people who would potentially be willing to volunteer...at inner city (more intimidating) polling places. Particularly, I am interested in names of Milwaukee area veterans, policemen, security personnel, firefighters, etc.” (emphasis added).129 As the ACLU of Wisconsin and the Milwaukee branch of the NAACP

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128 United States District Court, District of New Jersey: Democratic National Committee, et al Plaintiffs v. Republican National Committee et al, Defendants, Civil Action No: 81-3876 (DRD), Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff Democratic National Committee in Opposition to Defendant Republican National Committee’s Motion to Vacate or Modify The Consent Decree, January 19, 2009.
pointed out, in response to Van Hollen’s actions: “The formation of a voter fraud task force only in Milwaukee County reinforces an unsubstantiated perception that City of Milwaukee residents are more prone to commit election fraud. And, regardless of intent, a racial subtext is barely below the surface, given the fact that Milwaukee is the only majority-minority city in the state (emphasis added).”

The racialization of the voter fraud issue continued in 2010, with an incident a month before the gubernatorial election, in which dozens of billboards were placed throughout Milwaukee’s inner city, showing people behind jail bars, with the words “We Voted Illegally” and the penalty for voting illegally prominently displayed. The billboards, according to news reports, apparently were paid for “by a private family foundation.” Community leaders saw clear racial coding behind the billboard campaign. The Rev. Kenneth Wheeler, pastor of Cross Lutheran Church and a member of the Milwaukee Innercity Congregations Allied for Hope said: “The message is offensive and implicitly and explicitly creates a climate of fear in the African-American community that was historically denied justice and discouraged from voting.”

The billboard issue resurfaced in the 2012 elections as well, as Clear Channel Outdoor put up 85 billboards, paid for by an anonymous “private family foundation,” primarily in low-income and minority areas in the city of Milwaukee, warning “Voter Fraud is a Felony,” and noting that the penalty for voter fraud is “up to 3 ½ years and a $10,000 fine.” Community leaders denounced the signs as another attempt at minority voter suppression, but Clear Channel said the billboards were “not only in the African American and Hispanics areas, but also throughout the Milwaukee area.” Map 1 below shows the locations of the “voter fraud” billboards: the concentration of the ads on Milwaukee’s predominantly black north side and heavily Hispanic south side –and the paucity of billboards in Waukesha, Washington, and Ozaukee counties (all with population compositions over 90 percent white) -- is readily apparent.

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130 Press release, “ACLU, NAACP Object to Discriminatory Election Enforcement in Wisconsin,” September 17, 2008. Accessed as: www.alclu.org/voting-rights/alca-naacp-object-discriminatory-election-enforcement-wisconsin. The ACLU and NAACP also went on to contrast the treatment of a series of voting irregularities in exurban Oconomowoc (which came to light in April 2008 and which apparently affected election outcomes) with voting discrepancies in Milwaukee, noting that “voting irregularities can and do happen throughout Wisconsin –but when they do not occur in Milwaukee, they are called “mistakes” and not “fraud.”


Map 1: 
Locations of Voter Fraud Billboards in Metro Milwaukee: October 2012

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In short, from the apocryphal billboards of the 1956 Milwaukee mayoral campaign to the very real billboards of the 2010 and 2012 elections in Wisconsin, Milwaukee and Wisconsin have long histories of racialized electoral politics. Sometimes, consistent with the frank description of electoral strategy offered by Lee Atwater, these appeals have been overt and raw; but more frequently, especially in the modern era, the racialization is more coded, cast in “neutral” policy terms like “cutting wasteful government programs” or “fighting voter fraud.” But as Princeton’s Martin Gilens notes, “race coded issues are attractive to some politicians precisely because they can exploit the power of racial suspicion and animosity while insulating themselves from charges of race-baiting.”

A national study of public opinion during the 2012 election campaign provided further evidence that the voter ID issue fits into this pattern of policy “racialization.” The study found support for such laws was highest among those (non-African American respondents) “holding the highest levels of ‘racial resentment’,” and that the link between “racial resentment” and support for voter ID laws “persists even after controlling for the effects of partisanship, ideology, and a range of demographic variables.” In short, conclude the authors, “the effect found for racial resentment suggests that ostensibly race-neutral voter ID laws carry racial symbolism, similar to other issues such as welfare, crime and the death penalty, and even health-care policy, which have become racialized through political discourse.”

Submitted by: Marc V. Levine Date 10-18-13

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134 Gilens, ”Race Coding' White Opposition to Welfare": 602.
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ACADEMIC ADMINISTRATION:

Director, Consortium for Economic Opportunity, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2000-present

Director, Center for Canadian-American Policy Studies, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2000-present

Director, Center for Economic Development, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1990-2007


Coordinator, M.S. Program in Urban Studies, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1987-1995

Chair, Department of Urban Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1987-1989.

Assistant Dean for Strategic Planning, Goucher College, Towson, Md., 1982-1983.


PROFESSIONAL SERVICE:

Comité scientifique, Chaire de recherche du Canada en études québécoises et canadiennes, l’Université du Québec à Montréal, 2005-present.


Program Co-Chair, Urban Labour Markets, International Sociological Association Meetings-RC21, Amsterdam, 2001

Comité scientifique internationale, Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française, 1998-present

Comité aviseur, INRS-Urbanisation, 1998-1999


Peer Review Committee, National Association of Management and Technical Assistance Centers, 1997-98.


Program Co-Chair, Urban Affairs Association Annual Meeting, 1997

Comité scientifique international, Politique et Societes, 1995-present

Membership Committee, Urban Affairs Association, 1994-96.


Conference Program and Planning Committee, Midwest Region of Economic Development Administration, 1991-96.

Editorial Board, Quebec Studies, 1992-present


Associate Editor, Quebec Studies, 1990-1992

Board of Editors, Universities and Community Schools, 1989-present


Program Committee, Conference on "Universities, Community Schools, and Economic Development," held at the University of Pittsburgh, 1989.

Program Committee, Conference on "Universities, Community Schools, Job Training, Community Revitalization," held at the University of Pennsylvania, 1988.


Associate Editor, Urbanism: Past and Present, 1985-1986.


PUBLIC POLICY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE:

Milwaukee County Comprehensive Economic Development Plan, Advisory Committee, 2011-2012

Social Responsibility Committee, Aurora Health Care Systems, Milwaukee, WI, 2011-present

African American Male Unemployment Task Force, Milwaukee Common Council, 2010-2011

National Anchor Institutions Task Force, 2010-present

Board of Directors, Legacy Redevelopment Corporation, Milwaukee, WI, 2008-present


University School of Milwaukee, Board of Overseers, 2001-2002.


Board of Directors, Northeast Milwaukee Industrial Development Corporation, 1997-1999


Advisory Board, New Hope Project, Milwaukee Wisconsin, 1993-1996

President, Milwaukee French Immersion School Parent-Teacher Association, 1992-1993

City of Milwaukee Project Team on Employment and Income, 1992-1995


PUBLICATIONS:

Books:


Marc V. Levine et al, *Contextes de la politique linguistique québécoise.* (Québec: Conseil de la langue française, 1993)


Articles and Book Chapters:


"Introduction: Nationalism in Quebec," Quebec Studies, 8, (Spring 1989): 119-120.


POLICY REPORTS AND MONOGRAPHS:


The Economic Impact of the Child-Care Industry in Milwaukee County (Milwaukee: UWM Center for Economic Development, 2002).


Minority Business Ownership in Metropolitan Milwaukee: A Comparison with the Nation’s Largest Metropolitan Areas (Milwaukee: UWM Center for Economic Development, 2000).


(with Lauren McHargue) Capacity Inventory of Community Development Corporations in Milwaukee (Milwaukee: UWM Center for Economic Development, 1999).


The Feasibility of Economically Targeted Investing: A Wisconsin Case Study (Brookfield, WI: The International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, 1997).

(with Emily Van Dunk), Light Rail and Inner City Economic Development: An Analysis of the Proposed 27th Street and Wisconsin Avenue Station Area (Milwaukee: UWM Center for Economic Development, 1996).

(with Emily Van Dunk), The Economic Impact of Sinai-Samaritan Hospital on the Metropolitan Milwaukee Economy (Milwaukee: UWM Center for Economic Development, 1996).


(with John Zipp), Downtown Redevelopment in Milwaukee: Has it delivered for the City? (Milwaukee: UWM Center for Economic Development 1994).


OTHER PUBLICATIONS (selected)


“Wisconsin’s ‘skills gap’ is a fallacy,” BizTimes.com (Milwaukee), 26 February 2013.


(co-author) “It’s no time for another cut to UW System,” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 15 November 2011.


"L’avenir du français à Montréal," *Le Soleil (Quebec City)*, 13 janvier 1993, Point de vue.


"'Next Time' has arrived for Quebec and Canada," *The Baltimore Sun*, 6 July 1990, Perspective section.


**BOOK REVIEWS:**


Statecraft as Soulcraft by George Will. The Baltimore Sun, 3 July 1983.

The Deindustrialization of America by Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, and The Current Crisis in American Politics by Walter Dean Burnham. The Baltimore Sun 27 February 1983.


Economic Democracy by Martin Carnoy and Derek Shearer. The Baltimore Sun, 15 February 1981.

PROFESSIONAL PAPERS:

Papers presented at the following professional meetings:


Association for Canadian Studies, Canadian Learned Societies: Montreal (1995)


Association internationale des études québécoise: Quebec City (2002); Rimouski (2003); Sherbrooke (2004); Montreal (2005)

Conseil de la langue française: Quebec City (1992)

Entretiens du Centre Jacques Cartier: Montreal (1992); Lyon (1994)

États généraux sur la situation et l’avenir de la langue française: Montreal (2001)


Midwest Political Science Association: Chicago (1985)


Race, Nationalism, and Ethnicity in the 21st Century Conference: Milwaukee (1993)

Rethinking the Metropolis Conference: Milwaukee (2002).


Université du Québec à Montréal: Special conference: "La CUM et les nouveaux enjeux métropolitains": Montreal (1998)

Université du Québec à Montréal: Colloque international: "[S']approprier la ville": Montreal (2012)


Urban Affairs Association: St. Louis (1988); Baltimore (1989); Charlotte (1990); Portland (1995); Boston (2002); Salt Lake City (2005); Montreal (2006); Pittsburgh (2012)


AWARDS:

Ordre des francophones d'Amérique Award, Conseil de la langue française, 2005

Faculty Distinguished Public Service Award, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2000.


UWM Division of Community Outreach, "Community Partnership Award," 1993.

RESEARCH AND SERVICE GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS:


The Early Childhood Planning Council (principal investigator), “The Economic Impact of the Child-Care Industry in Milwaukee County,” $30,000 (awarded May 2002).


Government of Canada (co-principal investigator), "Program Enhancement Grant," $4,000 (awarded August 2000).

The Helen Bader Foundation (principal investigator), "Development of Peace Corps Fellows Program at UW-Milwaukee," $40,000 (awarded August 2000).


United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration (principal investigator and project director), "University Center for Economic Development," $100,000 (awarded September 1999).

United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration (principal investigator and project director), "University Center for Economic Development," $100,000 (awarded September 1998)


The Enterprise Foundation (principal investigator), "Non-Profit Enterprise Venture Fund Initiative," $33,000 (awarded April 1998).

Conseil international des etudes canadiennes (co-principal investigator), "Indicateurs de positionnement des villes Nords-Americaines," $5,000 CDN (awarded March 1998).

The Helen Bader Foundation (principal investigator), "Capacity Inventory and Best Practices Analysis of Milwaukee Community Economic Development Agencies," $12,500 (awarded December 1997).

The Helen Bader Foundation (principal investigator), "Non-Profit Entrepreneurialism Project: Planning Grant," $10,000 (awarded December 1997).
United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, University Center Program (principal investigator and project director), "University Center for Economic Development," $100,000 (awarded September 1997).

United States Department of Labor (principal investigator), "High Wage Job Opportunities for Dislocated Workers: Model Development," $20,000 (awarded February 1997).


United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, University Center Program (principal investigator and project director), "University Center for Economic Development," $100,000 (awarded September 1996).


International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans (principal investigator), "An Economically Targeted Investment Program for Milwaukee, $10,000 (awarded October 1995).

United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, University Center Program (principal investigator and project director), "University Center for Economic Development," $120,000 (awarded September 1995).

Milwaukee Foundation (principal investigator), "Analysis of Economically Targeted Investment Strategies for Communities," $5,000 (awarded September 1995).


Conseil international des Etudes canadiennes (co-principal investigator), "La restructuration des villes Nords-Americaines," $5,000 CDN (awarded March 1995).

United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, University Center Program (principal investigator and project director), "University Center for Economic Development," $122,025 (awarded August 1994).

Milwaukee Foundation (principal investigator), "Sectoral Targeting Analysis for Economic Development in Walker's Point," $15,000 (awarded April 1994).

United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, University Center Program (co-principal investigator and project director), "University Center for Economic Development," $122,025 (awarded September 1993).


City of Milwaukee, Department of Public Works (principal investigator), "The Potential Economic Impact of a Light Rail Transit System in Milwaukee," $10,000 (awarded February 1992).

United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, University Center Program (co-principal investigator and project director), "University Center for Economic Development," $100,000 (awarded September 1991).


United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, University Center Program (co-principal investigator and project director), "University Center for Economic Development," $100,000 (awarded September 1990).

Charles Stewart Mott Foundation Mini-Grant, "Universities, Community Schools, and Community Economic Development," $2,000 (awarded April 1990).


Canadian Embassy, Faculty Research Grant, "Deindustrialization and Income Inequality in Montreal, 1971-1986," $5,000 (awarded April 1988).


Canadian Embassy, Faculty Enrichment Grant, "Development of Courses in Canadian History and Canadian Urban Development," $3,000 (awarded December 1985).

American Association for the Advancement of Science, Congressional Fellow (awarded March 1983).

American Historical Association--Mellon Foundation Congressional Fellowship, $18,000 (awarded March 1983).


CONTRACTS:

Wisconsin Voices (co-PI), "An Economic and Political Analysis of the Milwaukee Region," $35,000 (awarded June 2013).

Aurora Health Care, “Economic Impact of Aurora Health Care,” $51,000 (awarded December 2012).


City of West Bend (co-PI), “Economic Analysis,” $5,000 (awarded December 2004).


Milwaukee Graphic Arts Institute, “Analysis of the Milwaukee-Area Printing Industry,” $3,000 (awarded December 2002).


City of Milwaukee, Community Development Block Grant (principal investigator), "Inner City Transportation and Jobs Analysis," $4,000 (awarded January 1998).

City of Milwaukee, Community Development Block Grant (principal investigator), "Near South Side Business Marketing Analysis," $15,000 (awarded January 1998).

New Berlin Chamber of Commerce and State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation (principal investigator), "New Berlin Transportation and Jobs Analysis," $13,000 (awarded January 1998).

Northeast Milwaukee Industrial Development Corporation (principal investigator), "NMIDC Technical Assistance: Phase Two," $2,000 (awarded July 1997).

Northeast Milwaukee Industrial Development corporation (principal investigator), "NMIDC Technical Assistance," $6,000 (awarded February 1997).


South Milwaukee Public Schools, (principal investigator) "South Milwaukee Public Schools Strategic Planning Technical Assistance," $1,500 (awarded December 1996).


Sinai Samaritan Medical Center, "An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Sinai Samaritan Hospital on Greater Milwaukee," $14,600 (awarded February 1996).

City of Milwaukee, Common Council Economic Development Committee (principal investigator), "A Feasibility Study of an Economically Targeted Investment Program in Milwaukee," $10,000 (awarded October 1995).

Milwaukee County Pension Board (principal investigator), "A Feasibility Study of an Economically Targeted Investment Program in Milwaukee," $15,000 (awarded October 1995).


International Longshoreman Association Local 815 (principal investigator), "Employee Ownership Feasibility Study," $21,500 (awarded January 1994).
International Longshoreman Association Local 815 (principal investigator), "Employee Ownership Feasibility Study: Proposal Preparation," $1,500 (awarded August 1993).

Northeast Milwaukee Industrial Development Corporation (principal investigator), "Industrial Corridor Technical Assistance," $1,800 (awarded July 1993).


Walnut Avenue Improvement Corporation (principal investigator), "Economic Analysis of the Walnut Avenue Area," $500 (awarded June 1993).

Esperanza Unida (principal investigator), "611Project Technical Assistance," $1,000 (awarded May 1993).


TEACHING AND RESEARCH EXPERTISE:

- 19th and 20th century Urban History (United States and Canada)
- Urban Economic Development Policy
- Politics and Policy in Canada and Quebec
- 19th and 20th century U.S. Political History
- The Politics of Multicultural Societies
Exhibit H
The table contains a total of 14,052,071 data columns.

**NOTE:** For information on confidentiality protection, nonsampling error, and definitions, see [http://www.census.gov/popest/cen2010/doc/e01.pdf](http://www.census.gov/popest/cen2010/doc/e01.pdf).

<table>
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<th>Genesee town, Waukesha County, Wisconsin</th>
<th>Pewaukee city, Waukesha County, Wisconsin</th>
<th>Waukesha city, Waukesha County, Wisconsin</th>
<th>Waukesha town, Waukesha County, Wisconsin</th>
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<tr>
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<td>5,410</td>
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<td>2,820</td>
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<td>Household who is Two or More Races</td>
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census.
Exhibit I
Waukesha Teens Charged with Hate Crimes

By Heather Shannon

ARCHIVED CONTENT

WAUKESHA - A coat of fresh paint covers the burned "KKK" and a swastika on a basketball court in the 900 block of Scott Avenue. But the message of hate won't disappear that easily.

Three 17-year-old Waukesha boys, Dylan Barnett, Thor Eggum, and Kurtis Hickey, have now been charged for setting the symbols on fire last month to keep black kids from playing on the court the three boys consider theirs.

The criminal complaint says Hickey told police he started the fire: "due to his hate for blacks." The complaint went on to say he knew the swastika and "KKK" would: "bring about a bad feeling when black people saw these symbols."

Police said Hickey and Eggum admitted to being racist. Even Hickey's MySpace page has a Confederate flag in the background.

None of the suspects would talk on camera. But what they're accused of doing is affecting other families in the area who are having a difficult time explaining the hatred to their children.

"I didn't think it was right. There should be no hate crimes around here at all," Waukesha dad Peter Buchholz said. "The parents maybe should have taught them a little more about that stuff."

The three boys face three and a half years in prison for allegedly setting the fires. They could each get an additional five years because this is considered a hate crime.

Find this article at:

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Sunday, September 20, 2009

Milwaukee: Waukesha Teens Charged with Hate Crimes

Milwaukee: Waukesha Teens Charged with Hate Crimes

-- WTMJ reports:
-- "A coat of fresh paint covers the burned 'KKK' and a swastika on a basketball court in the 900 block of Scott Avenue. But the message of hate won't disappear that easily."
-- "The criminal complaint says Hickey told police he started the fire: 'due to his hate for blacks.' The complaint went on to say he knew the swastika and "KKK" would: 'bring about a bad feeling when black people saw these symbols.'"

Posted by Heroes for Equal Rights Org (H.E.R.O.) at 1:05 PM

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